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Social and Demographic Consequences of Health insurance
Abstract
Scholars are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect that policies
are intricately connected to marriage, family structure, and social standing. The three chapters of this
dissertation study unintended consequences of health insurance policies in the United States. How
people gain private health insurance is connected to divorce (chapter 1) and availability of a public
insurance program at birth is associated with lower mortality not only in infanthood but also in adulthood
(chapter 2). US health policies that tie health insurance coverage to socioeconomic status add
dimensions to racial and ethnic inequality. Minorities spend more years without insurance due to their
greater probabilities of losing coverage (chapter 3). These chapters provide national landscapes of health
insurance coverage and inequality in the years prior to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 setting the baseline for post-reform comparisons.
In Chapter 1, I apply hazard models to the nationally representative longitudinal Survey of Income and
Program Participation (2004 panel) to find lower divorce rates among people who are enrolled in their
spouses’ health insurance policies. Women who depend on their husbands for health insurance had the
lowest rates of divorce. This chapter highlights how family- and employment-based insurance coverage
could create inequalities between families and between men and women.
In Chapter 2, I use US Vital Statistics data to compare changes in age-specific mortality rates between
cohorts born in states with Medicaid and cohorts born in states without Medicaid. I exploit the variation in
the timing of States’ Medicaid participation to establish a connection between the availability of public
insurance at birth to improvements in later life mortality. This chapter underscores the lasting
consequences of having access to medical care during critical periods in the life-course.
Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance across the life course and how it
contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage. African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have
high uninsurance rates mostly due to their greater likelihoods of losing the insurance that they already
have. Life-table simulations show that simply increasing the accessibility of health insurance does
surprisingly little to reduce disparities in insurance coverage. This paper draws attention to the
importance of developing policies that stabilize existing insurance.
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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Heeju Sohn
Jason Schnittker

Scholars are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect
that policies are intricately connected to marriage, family structure, and social standing.
The three chapters of this dissertation study unintended consequences of health insurance
policies in the United States. How people gain private health insurance is connected to
divorce (chapter 1) and availability of a public insurance program at birth is associated
with lower mortality not only in infanthood but also in adulthood (chapter 2). US health
policies that tie health insurance coverage to socioeconomic status add dimensions to
racial and ethnic inequality. Minorities spend more years without insurance due to their
greater probabilities of losing coverage (chapter 3). These chapters provide national
landscapes of health insurance coverage and inequality in the years prior to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 setting the baseline for post-reform
comparisons.
In Chapter 1, I apply hazard models to the nationally representative longitudinal
Survey of Income and Program Participation (2004 panel) to find lower divorce rates
among people who are enrolled in their spouses’ health insurance policies. Women who
vi

depend on their husbands for health insurance had the lowest rates of divorce. This
chapter highlights how family- and employment-based insurance coverage could create
inequalities between families and between men and women.
In Chapter 2, I use US Vital Statistics data to compare changes in age-specific
mortality rates between cohorts born in states with Medicaid and cohorts born in states
without Medicaid. I exploit the variation in the timing of States’ Medicaid participation to
establish a connection between the availability of public insurance at birth to
improvements in later life mortality. This chapter underscores the lasting consequences of
having access to medical care during critical periods in the life-course.
Chapter 3 examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance across
the life course and how it contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage. African
Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have high uninsurance rates mostly due to their greater
likelihoods of losing the insurance that they already have. Life-table simulations show
that simply increasing the accessibility of health insurance does surprisingly little to
reduce disparities in insurance coverage. This paper draws attention to the importance of
developing policies that stabilize existing insurance.
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Introduction: Socioeconomic Class and Health in the Context of Public
Policy in the United States

A well-developed literature in the social sciences shows how families share social,
economic, and human capital and how it translates into an intergenerational transmission
of social class. Health and mortality are established as both causes and consequences of
socioeconomic class. The chapters of this dissertation aim to contribute to the literature
that connects health and socioeconomic status across family ties.
This dissertation examines family processes and social inequality and their
interactions with health policy in the United States. People get married, bear children, and
make daily medical decisions in the context of the policy environment. Here, I
demonstrate how public policy plays a significant role in creating and shaping the
boundaries between social classes.
Health insurance coverage allows access to better medical care and mitigates the
adverse consequences of poor health for individuals and families. It is considered an
1

important, if not crucial, form of social insurance (Marmor et al. 2013). In the United
States, health insurance coverage is very closely tied to a person’s socioeconomic status.
Families with high-paying, stable earnings are more likely to enjoy consistent, higher
quality health insurance. Those that lack the means to afford private coverage turn to
arguably lower-quality public options such as Medicaid (Quesnel-Vallee 2004) or forgo
insurance altogether.
Health insurance coverage is more than a mere reward of employment and wealth.
It can in turn, affect the socioeconomic status of individuals and his or her family. Going
without insurance limits access to medical care, health, and the financial well-being of
the entire household (Himmelstein et al. 2009; Kasper et al. 2000; Nelson et al. 1999;
Zuvekas and Weinick 1999).
The current literature on the consequences of unequal health insurance coverage
predominantly focuses on short-term health outcomes and its resulting disparities. The
chapters of this dissertation contribute to current scholarship by drawing attention to
previously understudied demographic processes that may be influenced by health
insurance policies (divorce and long-term mortality) and by making improvements to
how researchers can measure and compare insurance coverage.
This dissertation bridges three major scholarly themes: transmission of
socioeconomic status, health, and public policy. Before summarizing each chapter, I
briefly review the major theories that guide the empirical analyses of this dissertation.
Bourdieu’s work on intergenerational transfer of social capital provided the
theoretical framework for much scholarship on the transmission of socioeconomic status
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within families. Parents would endow children with social capital that they would then
use to establish their own class on reaching adulthood. Families with greater
socioeconomic status had more capital to bestow on their offspring. And through this
process, social class was maintained across generations. The current literature uncovers
mechanisms beyond direct economic transfers that reinforce class boundaries. Higherincome parents cultivated their children to develop a social habitus that gave them an
advantage for academic and financial success in adulthood (Laureau 2003). These parents
are likely to better prepare their children for college with greater material resources for
education (Conley 2001; Schoeni et al. 2005) and social connections and information to
place them in high status occupations (Lubrano 2005). Children of different social classes
have disparate transitions into adulthood (Furstenberg 2010) completing the replication of
social class. Diverging demographic trends between social classes (McLanahan 2004)
reinforce these intergenerational disparities. Individuals with less education and lower
income are more likely to raise children in single-parent families (Edin and Kefalas 2005;
Martin 2006) arguably reducing the social capital that these children receive even more
(Amato and Gilbreth 1999; Amato and Rivera 1999).
Health and socioeconomic class are intertwined throughout the life-course and
across generations. Social and environmental mechanisms for intergenerational
transmission of health are also well-studied in social demography. The Barker and fetal
origins hypotheses motivated many studied that linked prenatal and early health
conditions to later adult outcomes. Being born into a high mortality environment was
associated with increased risk of ischemic heart disease in adulthood (Barker and
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Osmond 1986). Being born during a recession was also linked to lasting heighted
mortality (Van den Berg et al. 2006). Quasi-experimental studies find that cohorts in
utero during the 1918 Influenza Pandemic displayed increased incidence of physical
disability, lower educational achievement, and lower income in adulthood (Almond
2006). Similarly, children of mothers who were pregnant during the 1944 Dutch Famine
showed worse health outcomes throughout adulthood (Roseboom et al., 2001). More
direct explorations of the relationship between socioeconomic class and health
consistently find that health, education, and income are correlated with each other.
Children from low SES households were more likely to have health problems. The
correlation between parents’ income and child health becomes stronger as the child grows
older even after they leave the household (Case et al. 2005). In adulthood, poor health led
to diminished earnings and reductions in wealth (Cutler et al. 2008; Smith 2007). These
empirical studies work to establish long-term, intergenerational connections between
health and social class.
This dissertation explores the relationship between health and social inequality in
the context of health systems and public policy. The three chapters examine unintended
consequences of health insurance policy in the United States. Scholars and policymakers
are eager to evaluate the effects of health policy on health, but they often neglect that
policies are intricately connected to family processes and have lasting effects on health
and social class. I employ demographic tools to quantify the unintended consequences of
health insurance on family processes and demographic trends. Bane and Ellewood (1986)
changed how to think about poverty by examining spells of poverty. Through
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demographic methods, I reveal new insight into the interplay of health policy and social
processes that static, cross-sectional pictures may obscure.
The first chapter finds evidence that people who are enrolled in their spouses’
health insurance policies have lower risks of divorce. I also find that this association is
stronger among women than men. I apply hazard models to a nationally representative
longitudinal data (the Survey of Income Program Participation) to compare divorce risks
between insurance-dependent, that is, adults who are insured through their spouses, and
insurance-independent adults, that is, adults who have health insurance policies available
to them through their employment. The findings draw attention to the influence that a
marriage and employment-based health insurance system can have on divorce rates.
Establishing connections between health policy and family formation/dissolution are
especially important as the United States undergoes one of the largest health care reforms
of the past century.
The second chapter explores the enduring effects of Medicaid. Medicaid is a
means-tested federal program delivering public health insurance program to mostly lowincome women and infants. In this study, I show that the start of Medicaid was not only
associated with reducing infant mortality rates across states but was also associated with
health outcomes even after aging out of eligibility. For the research design, I exploit
variation in the timing of States’ Medicaid participation to establish a connection between
the initiation of Medicaid availability at birth to later-life mortality. This chapter
underscores the lasting consequences of having access to medical care during critical
periods in the life-course.

5

The third chapter examines the dynamics of gaining and losing health insurance
across the life course and how it contributes to racial and ethnic disparities in coverage.
African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians have high uninsurance rates mostly due to
their greater likelihood of losing the insurance that they already have especially during
early adulthood and middle age. Furthermore, life-table simulations show that simply
increasing the accessibility of health insurance does surprisingly little to reduce
uninsurance prevalence among minorities. This paper draws attention to the importance
of developing policies that stabilize existing insurance. This chapter motivates further
research on whether precarious insurance coverage among minority groups can explain
disparities in interactions with health care providers, medical decisions, and health
outcomes.
These are interesting topics to study in the wake of the Affordable Care Act
(ACA). The chapters set baselines for pre- and post- ACA comparisons once the rollout
is complete. State-level variation in ACA adoption provides an interesting setting for a
natural experiment to observe changes in family processes and social inequality that
coincide with the ACA. Medicaid expansions in select states will allow all low-income
persons regardless of marital and parental status to become eligible. Individual mandates
will further incentivize people to become insured and to stay insured. State-sponsored
insurance exchanges will diminish the strong connection between employment, marriage,
and access to health insurance in participating states.

6
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Chapter 1: Health Insurance and Risk of Divorce: Does Having Your Own
Insurance Matter?

ABSTRACT
Most American adults under 65 obtain health insurance through their employers or their
spouses’ employers. The absence of a universal healthcare system in the United States
puts Americans at considerable risk for losing their coverage when transitioning out of
jobs or marriages. Scholars have found evidence of reduced job mobility among
individuals who are dependent on their employers for healthcare coverage. This paper
finds similar relationships between insurance and divorce. I apply the hazard model to
married individuals in the longitudinal Survey of Income Program Participation
(N=17,388) and find lower divorce rates among people who are insured through their
partners’ plans without alternative sources of their own. Furthermore, I find gender
differences in the relationship between healthcare coverage and divorce rates: insurance
dependent women have lower rates of divorce than men in similar situations. These
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findings draw attention to the importance of considering family processes when debating
and evaluating health policies.
Love and commitment are often what couples believe secure and protect marriages from
divorce. Sociologists of the family however, find that practical considerations are
probably more important (Kalmijn, 1998). Married couples with high incomes are more
likely to stay married (Amato, 2010; Gibson-Davis, Edin, & McLanahan, 2005).
Educational attainment—an indicator of earnings potential—is also associated with
greater marital stability (Amato, 2010). Education and income are consistently stronger
predictors of divorce than sentiment-driven indicators. Recognizing the significance of
these factors, researchers are careful to take household income, the couple’s educational
attainment, wealth, and other resources into consideration as they study divorce patterns.
Researchers have yet to study insurance coverage as a factor that can influence divorce.
This paper examines the relationship between health insurance and divorce by asking
three main research questions. (1) Is there an association between being insured by a
spouse and divorce? (2) Does this association get stronger when one partner does not
have an independent source of health insurance? (3) Do these associations differ by
gender?
The United States is among the few and perhaps the only developed country that
does not provide universal healthcare to its residents (Jost, 2003). While seniors over 64
years of age are assured coverage under Medicare, the majority of non-elderly adult men
and women are left responsible for securing their own health insurance. Employment and
marriage are the top two sources of health insurance for American adults; 24% of non11

elderly adult women and 14% of men are covered as a dependent (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2011). In comparison, 55.3% of the adult population gains health insurance
though employment (US Census, 2012).
Insurance is consequential. Being uninsured is associated with lower healthcare
utilization, increased morbidity, and higher mortality (Institute of Medicine, 2004). Not
having insurance creates barriers to adequate access to healthcare (Institute of Medicine,
2002). Uninsured individuals are more likely to be diagnosed with late-stage cancer—a
disease that is often detected at early states during routine doctor visits (Halpern, War,
Pavluck, Schrag, Bian, & Chen, 2008)—and are less likely to have an ongoing
relationship with a health care provider (Holahan & Spillman, 2002). In addition, medical
expenses contribute to a large portion of personal bankruptcies in the United States
(Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, & Woolhandler, 2009). Considering these known risks of
being uninsured, it is not surprising that Americans treat health insurance as a valuable
commodity.
Even brief periods of uninsurance can be costly. As American adults transition
into and out of jobs and marriages, they risk losing health insurance coverage (Lavelle &
Smock, 2012; Meyer & Pavalko, 1996). No social infrastructure guarantees continued
health insurance through these transitions. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (COBRA) allows people to purchase insurance at the lower group rate
under certain conditions, but is only available for limited periods and its costs can be
prohibitive, especially for recently unemployed or divorced individuals. Many cannot
help but experience a gap in insurance coverage as they change jobs or go through
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divorce (Lavelle & Smock, 2012; Swartz & McBride, 1990). These gaps are significant.
They can increase premiums or limit payouts even when individuals gain coverage,
particularly for those who have on-going health care needs (van de Ven, van Vliet, Schut,
& van Barneveld, 2000). Gaps can also have significant financial consequences for those
who fall ill while uninsured.
Researchers who study employment and wages have established that the health
insurance benefits are an important part of an employee’s compensation; a job that
provides health insurance yields substantially higher total compensation than a job with
the same salary but no health benefits (Woodbury, 1983). Studies also show that
insurance can act as a significant motivator for people to seek and retain employment, at
times even deterring workers from pursuing otherwise better opportunities (Cooper &
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994). If health insurance plays such
a large role in the labor market, we can expect it to also play a role in the marriage
market. After all, approximately 36 million American adults under the age of 65 rely on a
family member to provide their health insurance (KFF, 2011). This paper finds that
married individuals who are dependent on their spouses for health insurance have lower
rates of divorce. Having private health insurance is highly correlated with socioeconomic characteristics such as high education, stable employment, and high income.
These factors all lower the risk of divorce, but the analyses show health insurance does
not follow the same pattern. This paper shows that divorce risk is lowest among people
who do not have the option of employment-based coverage and are insured under their
spouses’ plans. I use the longitudinal 2004 Panel of Survey of Income Program
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Participation (SIPP). The 2004 SIPP tracks a nationally representative sample of over
43,500 households over time with great granularity recording each member’s marital and
healthcare status every month from October 2003 through December 2007. I employ the
Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the relative risk of divorce between insurancedependent and non-dependent individuals.
BACKGROUND
In his economic models of marriage, Gary Becker (1974) posits that positive gains to
marriage and negative consequences of divorce motivate two individuals to stay married.
His theory argues that couples with greater economic resources have lower risks of
marital dissolution as these resources will increase the gains that individuals would derive
from their unions. Higher levels of income can protect married couples from financial
stressors (Sawhill, 1975). Economic assets, such as homeownership, can also have
stabilizing effects on marriage (Becker, Landes, & Michael, 1977; Levinger, 1979; South
& Spitze, 1986). By the same token, couples with higher levels of educational attainment
are less likely to divorce (Martin, 2006).
The decision to divorce is not always unilateral. Becker and his coauthors (1977)
explain that couples will remain married if the combined gains of staying married exceed
the combined benefits of separating. If person A wants to divorce while their partner B
does not, the latter can ‘compensate’ the former to make it worthwhile for both parties. If
the combined net benefit of the union is not enough to satisfy both partners, however, the
marriage will result in dissolution.
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This study examines health insurance as a potential gain to a marriage. Because
health insurance pertains to the household, it is perhaps a prominent feature of the
combined gains of marriage. A family health insurance plan that covers both spouses can
be considered a shared good that benefits from economies of scale. It is less costly than
two people being insured independently. A person who is not covered by their spouse
must either purchase an individual plan at a higher price or gain access to a group plan,
usually through employment. In this way, securing private health insurance for a married
couple is cheaper than two individuals obtaining their own and, therefore, it can be
considered an economic ‘gain’ of marriage.
While health insurance has not been explicitly studied as an economic gain of
marriage, it has been examined in the context of employment and job mobility (Cooper &
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994). Studies find that jobs that
offer health insurance plans have lower turnover rates (Cooper & Monheit, 1993;
Madrian, 1994; Monheit & Cooper, 1994). Likewise, being married to someone who can
provide a health insurance policy may increase the gains of the marriage, leading to lower
rates of divorce. My first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’ health plans
have lower rates of divorce
The second hypothesis examines the risk of losing health insurance coverage as a
potential negative consequence of divorce. Does the association between insurance
coverage and divorce get stronger when one partner does not have an independent source
of health insurance? Researchers of employer-specific insurance plans and job-mobility
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find that people who are expected to be worse off if they lose current coverage—for
example, employees with greater medical expenditures and those without spouses who
can provide coverage during transitions—have lower rates of job-mobility (Buchmueller
& Valletta, 1996; Cooper & Monheit, 1993; Gruber & Madrian, 2002; Madrian, 1994).
The economic consequence of divorce can also be influenced by whether those in a
marriage have access to group coverage independently. The cost of divorce for people
who can switch over to their employers’ plans on divorce will not be as high as those
whose only sources of insurance coverage is from their spouses. Not having a
comparable source of health insurance outside the marriage increases the negative
consequences of divorce that may lead to lower divorce rates. I use employer-sponsored
health insurance as a comparable alternative to spouse-provided health insurance plans.
There are alternatives, but they are not as relevant. Public means-tested cash transfers, for
example, do not appear to lower the cost of divorce. (Hoffman & Duncan, 1995).
Likewise, needs-based public health insurance, such as Medicaid, would not be a
comparable substitute to a private, family insurance plan. Needs-based public insurance
is often available only at very low levels of income and is sometimes considered to be of
lower quality than private insurance plans (Quesnel-Vallee, 2004).
Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance coverage
outside the marriage further lowers the risk of divorce for people enrolled in their
spouses’ plans.
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Gender, Health Insurance, and Marriage
The story of divorce and health insurance is further complicated by the issue of gender.
Historically, the division of labor in a US household has fallen along gendered lines
(Cherlin, 1995; Greenstein, 1995; Kalmijn, Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Nock, 1995;
Presser, 2000; Sayer, England, Allison, & Kangas, 2011). While spousal roles and duties
have become more flexible and negotiable over time, the traditional male breadwinner
model of the family persists (Greenstein, 1995). Women still do most housework and
childrearing (Cherlin, 1995; Nock, 1995) and marriages are more stable when the
husband earns more than his wife (Kalmijn et al., 2007). The responsibility of financial
contribution still primarily falls onto the man. A husband’s unemployment is strongly
related to divorce whereas a wife’s is not (Sayer et al., 2011). By the same token,
Teachman (2010) found that health-related work limitations among men but not among
women were associated with higher rates of marital disruption. The gains of a marriage
increase when the gendered expectations of their husbands resuming the role of the
primary breadwinner are met. For wives, spouses’ incomes have a positive relationship
with their self-reported levels of marital commitment (Nock, 1995).
The same relationship applies to health insurance as well. If traditional gender
roles put pressure on husbands to contribute financially via economic activity in the labor
market, it is also likely that men are expected to provide the family with health insurance.
Thus, I expect to see gender differences in the divorce rates associated with insurance
dependence in my analysis. My third hypothesis is:
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Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured through their spouses have lower rates of divorce
than men who are insured through their spouses
The fourth hypothesis examines whether the association between divorce and
having an alternative source of insurance is stronger for women than it is for men. With
men taking on the primary responsibility of the household income, it is not surprising the
economic consequences of divorce are less favorable for women than men (Burkhauser,
Duncan, Hauser, & Berntsen, 1991). Burkhauser and Duncan (1989) found that divorce
or separation was the single most financially detrimental event that could happen to nonelderly women. Divorce’s consequences for health insurance are equally striking
(Bernstein, Cohen, Brett, & Bush, 2008; Lavelle & Smock, 2012). Lavelle and Smock
(2012) find that, divorce leads to an eight percentage-point decline in women’s private
health insurance coverage, net of changes in employment, economic resources, and other
factors. This decline was even sharper for women insured as a dependent. A corollary of
these findings is that wives’ economic independence through labor force participation
may lower barriers against divorce (Duncan & Hoffman, 1985; Lavelle & Smock, 2012).
Duncan and Hoffman (1985) found that women’s human capital investments have some
modest effects on mitigating the decline in their economic situation following a divorce.
Similarly, Lavelle and Smock (2012) also found that just-divorced women who were
insured through their own plans were largely protected from the risk of losing private
coverage.
Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage
lowers divorce risk for women more so than for men
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METHOD
Data
I use the 2004 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to
examine the relationship between health insurance status and divorce. The SIPP is a
nationally representative series of longitudinal panels whose survey duration ranges from
2.5 to 4 years. The first SIPP panel was sampled in the early 1980s and a new panel was
re-sampled from the non-institutionalized population in the U.S. every one to four years.
The 2004 SIPP panel is a longitudinal dataset that follows its respondents for about four
years from October 2003 until December 2007. The strength of this dataset lies in its
large size, its wide range of household insurance and demographic variables, and its
longitudinal structure. The SIPP survey is divided into core questionnaires and topical
modules. The core questionnaire collects data for the same variables every month
throughout the study period. The SIPP administers a topical module containing a
different theme (i.e. marital history) once every four months. The SIPP then creates
longitudinal panels checking for data inconsistencies and missing values. The Census
Bureau accounts for missing values by logically deriving from other available
information when possible. They rely on several imputation techniques to fill in the
remaining missing data. Thus, if a respondent completed a questionnaire or a module, all
variables had valid values. Most of the variables that I use in my analyses are from the
core questionnaires. Since these variables are recorded every month, I can get relatively
close estimates of when changes occurred. Life events such as divorce and changes to
insurance rarely happen multiple times within a single month.
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The 2004 SIPP collected data for 45,540 individuals. The hypotheses in this paper
pertain to the risk of divorce. Therefore, I only include married individuals in the analytic
sample. I dropped 14,239 individuals (33% of total initial 2004 SIPP dataset) who were
not married during the study period. Furthermore, I only include married individuals
whose marriage duration is known. The sample includes people who were already
married when the SIPP started to collect data in October 2003 and people who became
married during the study period before it ended in December 2007. For those who were
already married in October 2003, I derive their marriage durations from their marital
history topical module that the SIPP administered in May 2004. I exclude 1,354 (3% of
initial 2004 SIPP dataset) married respondents who did not complete the marital history
topical module from the sample. Lastly, I limit my analysis to non-elderly adults. Those
over 65 are almost universally insured through Medicare and divorce may affect their
insurance status differently than the rest of the adult population. I exclude 10,559 persons
(24% of initial data) over the age of 64 or under the age of 18 from the sample.
My analysis sample consists of 17,388 individuals who were married at some
point during the study period between October 2003 and December 2007. They
collectively experienced over 500 divorces. I weight the observations using sampling
weights to compensate for SIPP’s different selection probabilities into the 2004 panel
across subpopulations.
Variables
Marital Status. The 17,388 individuals in my sample, weighted to represent
approximately 46 million US residents, were married at some point during the study
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period. A change in a respondent’s marital status reflects a marriage or divorce/separation
sometime during the previous 30 days. Only the respondents who are married are at risk
of divorce or separation and I limit hazard calculations to the currently married at any
point in time. The incremental hazards of separation in response to all covariates are
similar to the hazards of divorce. Sensitivity tests result in similar hazard patterns for all
three events: divorce only, separation only, and divorce or separation. The analyses in
this paper examine the hazard of either divorce or separation.
Health Insurance Status. I combine two SIPP variables asking health insurance
type and coverage source to create a nominal scale to differentiate individuals who are
covered by their own plan from those covered under someone else's, government
sponsored need based insurance (Medicare or Medicaid), or none at all. The SIPP
specifically asks if the primary subscriber is the respondent’s spouse at only one point in
time during the survey period. More than 95% of married people on June 2005 who are
insured on someone else’s plan are insured on their spouses’ plan. I assume that this
extremely high rate of spousal coverage among married individuals who are not primary
subscribers is approximately constant throughout the study period. I lag insurance status
by one month to associate the insurance status prior to the divorce, as this marital event is
often accompanied by a simultaneous change in health care status. I have conducted
sensitivity test using a two, three, and six month lag time between insurance status and
marital disruption. There is little difference in the coefficients and the hypotheses tests up
to a lag time of three months. At six months, the coefficients in the hazard models
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become smaller in size, but even with a lag time that is one-eighth of the total survey
period the tests of hypotheses yield the same results.
Alternative Source of Health Insurance. In my analysis, I consider individuals
who are unemployed, contingent workers, or employed part-time at small companies with
less than 100 employees to be without access to employer-sponsored health insurance
plans outside the marriage. Full-time employment status and the size of the firm are two
indicators that predict whether an employer offers health insurance to an employee
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Throughout the study period, 97 to 99 percent of firms
with over 200 workers offered health insurance to their employees, whereas only 59 to 65
percent of smaller firms offered insurance plans (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013). Very
few firms offered insurance plans to temporary workers (three to six percent). Less than a
quarter of small firms offered plans to their part-time staff but almost half (47%) of large
firms offered insurance to workers who were not full time employees (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2013). Lavelle and Smock (2012)’s study also find that full time workers
were largely protected from insurance loss after divorce.
I confirm from the 2004 SIPP that its respondents’ employment statuses and their
employers’ firm sizes are indeed good predictors of whether the respondents have access
to health benefits. I test how closely these variables capture respondents’ access to
employment-based health insurance by examining single, never-married individuals.
Almost 80% of single, never-married respondents who I assigned as having “access to
employer-sponsored health insurance” are insured as the primary subscriber. About half
of the never-married people who I categorized as having access but are in fact uninsured,
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voluntarily elected not to enroll in their employers’ plans. The SIPP asked specific
questions on whether a respondent’s employer offers insurance plans and his or her
reasons for not enrolling only once in June 2005. Therefore, I could not use this variable
to create a better measurement of the availability of employment-based insurance
throughout the entire period.
Control Variables. I incorporate demographic and socioeconomic variables that
prior research identified as determinants or predictors of divorce—education, race and
ethnic origin, number of children, age, marital history, and household income (Amato,
2010; Casper & Bianchi, 2001; Cherlin, 1992). My models include gender, race/ethnicity,
educational attainment, the number of children, and a polynomial term for age as
controlling covariates. Many households in the SIPP report income that fluctuates
significantly from month to month. Some households report their entire annual income in
one month leaving the monthly income for the rest of the year at zero. To smooth the
income flow, I use the average of monthly total family income to measure the family’s
level of financial standing. I expect higher educational attainment, higher income, and
having more children to be associated with lower rates of divorce (Amato, 2010). Marital
history is another predictor of divorce or separation (Becker et al., 1977; Lehrer, 1988;
Presser, 2010). I include an indicator for whether or not the current marriage is a first
marriage. Higher order marriages may be more likely to end in divorce or separation
(Becker et al., 1977; Lehrer, 1988). I also include a polynomial term for the length of
marriage. Probability of dissolution decreases with the duration of marriage (Becker et
al.,1977; Presser, 2000). Couples who would end up divorced tend to end their marriage
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earlier than later (Becker et al., 1977) and people make more marriage-specific
investments (e.g. children, sexual compatibility) the longer they are together (Lehrer,
1988). All covariates with the exception of gender and race are time-varying.
Analytic Strategy
I use Cox's proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) to measure the effect of health
insurance on marriage. This model estimates the incremental risk of an event happening
to one group relative to a reference group. A person’s hazard is a multiplicative replica of
the baseline hazard based on his or her set of covariates. In this way, the model can
identify characteristics that are associated with greater or lower hazards of events such as
divorce (Bumpass, 1990). I use STATA13’s stcox package to estimate all hazard
coefficients. I test the model’s assumption that divorce hazards of the comparison groups
are proportional over time. I interact the key variables of the analysis (insurance status
and access to employer-sponsored health plans) with time (reference month) and test for
statistically significant time-varying effects. A joint test of significance revealed no
systematic change in the association between insurance status and access to employersponsored health plans.
I estimate four hazard models to test each of the four hypotheses in this paper.
The first model estimates the divorce hazards associated with insurance status. Model 2
adds access to employment-based insurance to model 1 and interacts it with the
respondent’s insurance status. Model 3 interacts gender with insurance status to examine
any gender differences in the association between insurance and divorce. The fourth
model is a three-way interaction between insurance status, access to an employment-
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based option, and gender. I present the hazards associated with the interactions in Models
2-4 with a series of dummy variables. I report these hazards in odds ratios. Each odds
ratio indicates the relative hazard of divorce or separation of a respondent with a
particular characteristic relative to the reference group. All models include covariates for
age, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, marriage duration, and logged
average monthly income as controls. I then select the relevant coefficients from the
hazard models to explicitly test the four hypotheses of this paper. I calculate p-values
from one-sided t-tests adjusted for false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995).
These p-values are more conservative than unadjusted p-values as they take into account
that the probability of falsely rejecting a null condition increases with the number of tests
performed. I present the four Cox hazard models and their hypothesis tests in the main
results section of this paper.
RESULTS
Descriptive Results
I estimate divorce hazards from the 17,388 individuals in the 2004 SIPP who were
married at some point between October 2003 and December 2007. Table 1.1 shows the
basic descriptive statistics of my analysis sample. The percentages and averages
presented in Table 1.1 are weighted to represent the adult US married population under
age 65. About half the sample was insured under their own names and a third were
insured as dependents. Less than 20% of the analysis sample were insured by need-based
government plans or were uninsured. About a third received four-year college degrees
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and about another third did not receive any education beyond high school. Roughly half
the respondents were women.
[Table 1.1. Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures]
Being insured under one’s own name was correlated with other measures of
socioeconomic standing. Over 85% of people with their own health insurance were
employed full-time and contributed over half of their households’ total incomes on
average. They were also more likely to have attended college. I show in Table 1.2 that
more married women than men were insured as a dependent. In concordance with the
findings by the Kaiser Family Foundation (2011) women in my sample were more likely
than men to be insured on another’s plan. About 44% of married women, compared to
16% of married men, were insured as dependents. The educational attainment and income
of these men were also not too different from the married men who were insured under
their own names. Men who were enrolled as a dependent still have higher earnings and
were more likely to have attended college than their female counterparts. While the
insurance-dependent men earned less on average, the proportion with some postsecondary education was slightly higher.
[Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Risk Population by Insurance Status and Gender]
While individuals who were insured under their own plans contributed proportionally
more to total household income, those who were insured through their spouses also made
economic contributions to the household. The sizes of these contributions however,
differed by gender. Men who were enrolled on another’s insurance plan contributed 41%
of the total household income, on average. Women who were enrolled on another’s
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insurance plan, on the other hand, contributed on average, less than 20%. Table 1.3
shows the differences in economic contribution to the household by insurance status and
gender. These percentages represent the average monthly earnings of an individual as a
proportion of the monthly total household income during the marriage. Total household
income includes income from means-tested cash transfers and income from property.
[Table 1.3. Earnings Contribution to Total Household Income by Insurance and Gender
(%)]

Main Results
The following section tests and reports the results of the four main hypotheses of this
paper. I test each hypothesis with a separate Cox proportionate hazard model (Models 1
to 4) in the same order that I presented in the background section.

Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’ health plans
have lower rates of divorce
[Table 1.4. Hypothesis Test 1: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status]
At any point in time, married individuals who were insured on their spouses’ plans were
indeed significantly less likely to divorce or separate than those who were covered under
their own policies. Being dependent on one’s spouse for health insurance lowered the
divorce hazard by almost 70%. The odds of divorce associated with being insured by a
spouse (0.321) were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Table 1.4 shows the odds
ratios for covariates related to insurance and family income. Logged family monthly
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income had a significant negative association with divorce hazard consistent with prior
findings (Bumpass, Martin, & Sweet, 1991). The insurance coefficients remain
significant indicating that their association with divorce could not be entirely explained
by the family’s income.

Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance coverage
outside the marriage further lowers the risk of divorce for people enrolled in their
spouses’ plans.
[Table 1.5. Hypothesis Test 2: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to
Employment-based Option]
Model 2 confirms that not having an employment-based source of insurance was
associated with further declines in divorce hazards among individuals who were insured
by their spouses. This model interacts insurance status with access to employer-sponsored
plans as people may have had the option to enroll in their own employers’ health plans
but had to forgo them in favor of their spouses’ family policies. Table 1.5 reports the
divorce odds ratio for each insurance status group who had and who did not have an
employment-based option. The divorce ratio of someone insured under their spouses’
plans with an option for an employer-sponsored plan was 0.433 relative to persons who
were insured under their own names. Individuals insured under their spouses’ plans
without access to employer-sponsored plans had divorce hazard ratios of 0.179. Both
coefficients were significant at the alpha 0.005 level. I test whether not having access to
an employer-sponsored plan significantly lowered the divorce hazards among people who
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were insured by their spouses in the lower panel of Table 1.5. Not having an insurance
option outside the marriage further lowered divorce odds by 0.412 and this difference is
statistically significant at the alpha 0.005 level. Logged family monthly income had a
significant negative association with divorce in Model 2. However, similarly to the first
model, family income did not completely moderate the relationship between insurance
and divorce.

Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured through their spouses have lower rates of divorce
than men who are insured through their spouses
[Table 1.6. Hypothesis Test 3: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Gender]
Model 3 shows that divorce hazards associated with being covered by a spouse’s health
insurance did not differ by gender. Men who were insured on their spouses’ plans had
divorce risks that were 0.475 that of men who were primary subscribers. Women who
were insured by another had hazards of 0.373 of the same reference group (Table 1.6).
The difference in hazard ratio between men and women were not statistically significant.
Model 3 reveals another interesting gender difference. A woman who had her own source
of health insurance was associated with a significantly higher hazard of divorce than a
man who was the primary subscriber. This is consistent with some findings from prior
research on the positive relationship between women’s financial independence and
likelihood of divorce (South and Spitze, 1986; Greenstein, 1995). While a wife’s earnings
can increase gains and stability to a marriage by augmenting the household income
(McLanahan, 2004), empirical evidence also shows that wives who earned more than
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their husbands were more likely to experience divorce (Kalmijin et al., 2007). Because
the divorce risks of women who were primary subscribers were so high, the differences
in divorce hazards between primary and dependent insurance subscribers were greater
among women (1.580 vs 0.373) than among men (1.000 vs 0.475).

Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage
lowers divorce risk for women more so than for men
[Table 1.7. Hypothesis 4: Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status, Access to Employmentbased Option, and Gender]
The divorce hazards of spouse-insured women who did not have an employment-based
source were significantly lower than their male counterparts. The divorce hazards of men
who were insured by their spouses and did not have employment-based options were
0.489. The hazards for similar women were 0.179 (Table 1.7). The difference in divorce
odds between these two groups was statistically significant at the alpha 0.05 level. The
reference group for Model 4 consists of male primary subscribers who were most likely
to have employer-sponsored insurance.
Having an outside option for insurance was not associated with higher divorce
hazards among men when they were already insured by their wives (Table 1.7). The story
is different for women. The divorce hazards of women who were insured by their spouses
but also had access to employment-based plans outside their marriages were significantly
higher than spouse-insured women who did not have alternative sources through
employment. The odds ratio of 0.412 associated with having access to employer-
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sponsored insurance plans among women who were insured through their spouses was
statistically significant (Table 1.7). These coefficients’ significance persists even when
family income is included as a covariate in Model 4. Taken together, these findings
indicate that the insurance that a spouse provides may act as a deterrent to marital
disruption in addition to other economic predictors of divorce such as employment and
income.
DISCUSSION
This paper tests two main ideas. Does being dependent on a spouse for health insurance
lower the hazard of divorce? And, does this relationship between health insurance
dependency and divorce differ between men and women? The results affirm that on
average, people who were insured through their spouses’ health plans had lower rates of
divorce. Incorporating employment status into the baseline model shows that higher
levels of dependency on their spouses for health insurance coverage further led to
diminished risks of divorce or separation. These results are in concordance with the
findings from researchers of employer-provided health benefits and job mobility. Not
having an alternative source for health care outside their current arrangement—
employment and marriage—made individuals less likely to terminate their jobs and
marriages.
The results further demonstrate that the relationship between insurance
dependency and marital stability differed by gender. The gendered relationship between
health insurance and divorce mirrors the dynamics of income and marital stability. Risk
of divorce rises along with wives’ contribution to the family income in excess of their
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husbands’ with the most stable marriages being those where the husband is the primary
earner (Heckert, Nowak, & Snyder, 1998; Kalmijn, Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Ono,
1998). Likewise, I find divorce rates are the highest among women who had access to
health insurance independent of their husbands. While women’s employment may have
transitioned from being a marital destabilizer to a stabilizer in recent decades
(Oppenheimer, 1994; Sayer et al., 2011), it appears that securing the family health
insurance still remains within the male domain.
There are several limitations to this study. I recognize that marital decisions may
not always be unilateral and often result from joint decision-making between the two
spouses. A wife may be motivated to stay together in consideration for the husband’s lack
of health insurance. Whatever mechanisms at play, my results show the different divorce
outcomes based on an individual’s insurance situation. While the monthly health
insurance and marital status measurements in the SIPP are strengths in determining a
relationship between the two, I also note that couples often obtain legal divorce decrees
months after they make their decisions. The health insurance situation of the two
individuals involved in the failing marriage may have changed since beginning divorce
proceedings. Research has shown increases in married women’s labor force participation
in the periods prior to divorce (Gray, 1995). Similarly, the insurance-dependent partner
may be motivated to secure other sources for health insurance in anticipation of the
change in marital status. Applications for divorce specifically address the issue of
healthcare coverage and divorcing individuals are fully aware of the termination of
benefits through their soon-to-be former spouse. If this is the case, the effects on divorce
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rates associated with insurance-dependence may be an upper-bound more relevant to
couples who were not able to secure independent coverage the month immediately prior
to the finalization of the divorce. My sensitivity analyses with lagged insurance statuses
of two, three, and six months indeed show that the longer the lag, the coefficient
decreases in magnitude. Nevertheless, hypotheses tests still yield the same conclusion;
insurance-dependence lower risk of marital disruption and that this association is more
pronounced for women than for men.
The health status of an individual may change the association between insurance
and divorce. Having poor health may increase the dependency on a spouse’s health
insurance plan as having continuous coverage become more important and poor health
can also negatively impact employment prospects. The SIPP, unfortunately, does not
have good measures of health to adequately capture the respondents’ need for health
insurance. In a sensitivity analysis, I used self-rated health rated on a five-point scale both
as a control and as a moderator for the relationship between insurance and divorce. This
variable in the 2004 SIPP was problematic as less than 3% of the analytic sample
indicated that they were not in good health and the SIPP only recorded the variable twice
during the four-year data collection period. Self-rated health in this case, was neither a
predictor of divorce nor an influential moderator.
Lastly, the SIPP’s short study period of 48 months can also be another limitation
of the data. The study can only prospectively observe the risk of divorce of a couple only
for a four-year window of their marriage. It cannot account for the entire history of all
couples’ marriages by tracking them from their wedding till its dissolution through
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divorce or death. The divorce and separation hazards are estimated from this longitudinal
data’s four-year study period and are extrapolated throughout couples’ marital life
courses.
Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the broader literature
examining the determinants of marital stability. It distinguishes health insurance’s
influence on divorce from other measures of socioeconomic status such as education,
income, and employment. If private insurance coverage was simply an artifact of these
characteristics, we would expect that those with stable employer-based coverage would
have the lowest rates of divorce. On the contrary, the analyses demonstrate that spouseinsured persons who have less economic options are the ones who are the least likely to
divorce. While the traditional economic resources contribute to lower divorce rates by
making the marriage more attractive, it is the aversion to the risk of losing health
insurance that deters people away from divorce. It is a subtle but an important distinction
especially when studying health policies that aim to guarantee health coverage to more
people. The incentive to stay in marriages for health insurance may be stronger for those
with lower prospects of securing and maintaining private health insurance through
employment. The negative association between insurance dependence and divorce that
we see in this paper may likely to be stronger among people with low socioeconomic
status; these people may rely more on their spouses to protect themselves from the risk of
losing health coverage.
This paper also underscores the gendered patterns in marriage and economic
dependence. The reduction in divorce rates associated with insurance dependence is
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stronger among women than for men. It is consistent with research showing that
American marriages are still governed by gendered social norms; men are often expected
to resume the responsibility of financially providing for the family through labor force
participation outside the household.
This paper draws attention to the strong connection between health care and
marriage. Acquiring health insurance in the United States is largely dependent on work
and marriage—two things that are valued in American society (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2011). The system rewards adults who seek and maintain good employment
or who remain married to partners who can provide spousal coverage. When affordable
and dependable health care is not guaranteed, people are incentivized to conform to the
social behaviors that American policies promote. Whether or not sociologists and health
researchers agree that access to good health care should be so intricately tied to family
values, they cannot neglect the inevitable influences that they have on each other.
Divorce is only one of many family processes that could be affected by health care
policies in the United States. The findings in this study call attention to the importance of
taking into consideration family dynamics when developing and evaluating health care
policies. Marriage, childbirth, divorce, remarriage, and transitions to adulthood are all
significant life events that could be shaped by policies. Understanding the relationship
between health policies and family processes is crucial to working toward a more
effective health care system that improves the overall health and happiness of the
population.
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Table 1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Study Measures (N = 17,388)
Population at Risk

M or %

Insurance Status
Insured under own name
Insured under someone else's plan
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)
Uninsured
Race/ethnicity
Non-Hispanic White
African American
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Educational Attainment
Less than High School
High School Diploma or Equiv.
Associate degree or some college
Bachelors' degree
Advanced degree
Children
Not living with Children
One child
Two children
Three children

SD

50.84
31.64
5.64
11.88
73.55
7.66
12.58
3.84
2.47
9.43
21.06
37.47
20.95
11.09

36.85
23.09
24.90
15.16
Age
41.85
10.61
Family Monthly Income
6,712.19
5,116.87
Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female
0.53
Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first
month of marriage). Values weighted to represent the US population.
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Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics of Risk Population by Insurance Status and Gender (N = 17,388)

Sample Size (%)

Avg. Monthly Earnings

Proportion with some

(USD)

college education (%)

Mean Age

Insurance Status

Insured under own name

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

Men

Women

(n=8,091)

(n=9,297)

(n=8,091)

(n=9,297)

(n=8,091)

(n=9,297)

(n=8,091)

(n=9,297)

66.8

36.8

42.9

41.9a

4,838

2,902a

75.9

76.6

17.0

44.6

43.9b

41.8a

3,397b

1,393a,b

77.7

72.5a,b

4.4

6.8

45.0b

38.2a,b

737b

390a,b

44.3b

40.6b

11.9

11.9

38.9b

37.9b

1,873b

742a,b

42.4b

42.9b

Insured under
someone else's plan
Gov't Insurance
(Medicare, Medicaid)
Uninsured

Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first month of marriage). Values are weighted to
represent the US population.
a

Denotes statistical difference between men and women at significance level, 0.05. bDenotes difference from being self-insured at significance

level 0.05.
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Table 1.3 Earnings Contribution to Total Household Income by Insurance and Gender
in Percentages

Insurance Status

Men

Women

Overall

Insured under own name

63.11

41.91

54.96

Insured under someone else's plan

41.96

18.64

24.52

Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)

26.39

13.45

18.14

Uninsured

58.97

22.47

39.58

Note: Population at risk at first reference month (November 2003 if already married or first
month of marriage). N = 17,388 (men n = 8,091; women n = 9,297). Values are weighted to
represent the US population. Total household income includes income from property and
means-tested cash transfers.
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Table 1.4 Test of Hypothesis 1
Model 1. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status (hazards in odds
ratios)
Insurance Status
Insured under own name
Insured under someone else's plan
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)
Uninsured

(reference)
0.32***
0.59***
0.73*

a
b

Logged family monthly income
0.44***
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order
marriage, and marriage duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388
(men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US population.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.
Test of Hypothesis 1: Married individuals who are insured through their spouses’
health plans have lower rates of divorce
Key Coefficient for Hypothesis Test
a Insured under own name (reference group)
1.00
b Insured under someone else's plan
0.32***
Ratio of b to a
0.32***
Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.
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Table 1.5 Test of Hypothesis 2
Model 2. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Access to
Employment-based Option (hazards in odds ratios)
Two-way interaction between insurance status and access to
employment-based option
Access to
Insurance Status
Employment-based
Option
Insured under own name
Yes
(reference)
Insured under own name
No
0.59*
Insured under someone else's plan
Insured under someone else's plan

Yes
No

0.43***
0.18***

Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)

Yes
No

1.03
0.37***

Uninsured
Uninsured

Yes
No

1.03
0.39***

a
b

Logged family monthly income
0.41***
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order
marriage, and marriage duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388
(men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US
population.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.

Test of Hypothesis 2: Not having an employment-based source of health insurance
coverage outside the marriage further lowers the divorce risk of people enrolled in
their spouses’ plans.
Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test
a Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option
0.43***
b Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option
0.18***
Ratio of b to a
0.41***
Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.
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Table 1.6 Test of Hypothesis 3
Model 3. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status and Gender (hazards in
odds ratios)
Two-way interaction between insurance status and gender
Insurance Status
Insured under own name
Insured under own name

Gender
Male
Female

(reference)
1.58***

Insured under someone else's plan
Insured under someone else's plan

Male
Female

0.48**
0.37***

Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)
Gov't Insurance (Medicare, Medicaid)

Male
Female

0.41*
0.88

Uninsured
Uninsured

Male
Female

0.91
0.89

a
b

Logged family monthly income
0.44***
Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order marriage,
and marriage duration as controls; coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 (men n=8,091;
women n=9,297). Values are weighted to represent the US population.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.

Test of Hypothesis 3: Women who are insured on their spouse’s health plans have lower
rates of divorce than men who are insured by their spouse
Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test
a Insured under someone else's plan & male
0.48**
b Insured under someone else's plan & female
0.37***
Ratio of b to a
0.78
Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate
(Benjamini and Hochberg 1995).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.
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Table 1.7 Test of Hypothesis 4
Model 4. Cox Regression of Divorce Hazard on Insurance Status, Access to Employment-based Option,
and Gender (hazards in odds ratios)
Three-way interaction between insurance status, access to employment-based option, and gender
Insurance Status

Access to Employmentbased Option

Gender

Insured under own name

Yes
Yes
No
No

Male
Female
Male
Female

(reference)
1.70***
0.75
0.75

Insured under someone
else's plan

Yes
Yes
No
No

Male
Female
Male
Female

0.44*
0.61*
0.49
0.19***

Gov't Insurance
(Medicare, Medicaid)

Yes
Yes
No
No

Male
Female
Male
Female

0.22
2.03*
0.41*
0.49***

Uninsured

Yes
Yes
No
No

Male
Female
Male
Female

1.13
1.49
0.52*
0.47**

Logged family monthly
income

a
b
c
d

0.40***

Note: Model includes age, age-squared, race, education, children, higher-order marriage, and marriage
duration as controls. Coefficients are not shown. N=17,388 (men n=8,091; women n=9,297). Values are
weighted to represent the US population.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.

Test of Hypothesis 4: Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers
divorce risk for women more so than for men
Key Coefficients for Hypothesis Test
0.49
c Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & male
0.18***
d Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & female
Ratio of d to c
0.37*
Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers divorce risk for men
0.44*
a Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option & male
0.49
c Insured under someone else's plan & has no employment-based option & male
Ratio of c to a
1.12
Not having an alternative source of health insurance outside the marriage lowers divorce risk for women
0.61*
b Insured under someone else's plan & has employment-based option & female
Insured
under
someone
else's
plan
&
has
no
employment-based
option
&
female
0.18***
d
Ratio of d to b
0.30***
Note: P-values of one-sided t-tests are corrected adjusted for False Discovery Rate (Benjamini and Hochberg
1995).
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .005.
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Chapter 2: Life-Course Mortality Consequences of Public Health Insurance
in the United States

ABSTRACT
Forty-four percent of the Affordable Care Act’s 1.1 trillion-dollar expenditure is
projected to be spent on expanding Medicaid. The impact of Medicaid on its recipients
and on the broader population has been a matter of contentious debate since its inception
in 1965. My contribution to this debate is two-fold. First, I examine infant mortality
improvements between 1959 and 1979 that accompanied states’ Medicaid participation.
Here, I exploit the variation in when each of the 50 States adopted Medicaid to estimate
its impact on national infant mortality rates. The annual rate of infant mortality decline
doubled with Medicaid participation. Mortality predictions without Medicaid result in
78,000 excess infant deaths between 1965 and 1980. Second, I examine Medicaid’s
lasting consequences that persist into adulthood. Cohorts born post-Medicaid
experienced greater improvements in mortality even after aging out of eligibility.
Medicaid is still shaping the US population today. A cohort born in 1970 without
Medicaid would have 13,700 fewer people aged 40 in 2010.
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Title II of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) aims to expand Medicaid eligibility to
an estimated 17 million more Americans (Congressional Budget Office 2011). This is the
largest initiative for public health insurance since the creation of Medicaid and Medicare
as a part of the 1965 Social Security Amendments. Medicaid is a means-tested
government insurance program aiming to provide health insurance to people who cannot
afford to pay for private health policies. Researchers and policy-makers debate over
whether this single-payer government-run insurance program is an effective way to
deliver health care services to low-income and medically needy people (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2013). Critics of Medicaid claim that this public insurance not only fails to
adequately benefit its target population, but it also has detrimental effects on the privately
insured (McDonough 2011). A large body of literature examining the effects of Medicaid
on its recipients has emerged since the program’s inception (Baldwin et al. 1998;
Braveman et al. 1993; Copeland and Meier 1987; Currie and Grogger 2002; Devany et al.
1992; Guyer 1990; Howell 2001; Lykens and Jargowsky 2002; Moss and Carver 1998;
Schor et al. 2007). However, few if any studies examine Medicaid’s contribution to
general population health and its long-term consequences. In this paper, I examine
changes in the rates of decline in states’ infant, childhood, and adult mortality associated
with the availability of Medicaid at birth. I exploit the variation in States’ timing of
Medicaid participation between 1966 and 1979 to address two research questions. (1) Did
Medicaid reduce infant mortality rates at the population level? (2) Did the availability of
Medicaid at birth have lasting consequences on mortality into adulthood? Macro-level
views of the consequences of large-scale health care reforms are informative as the
policies often influence individuals outside their immediate targeted population. And
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these health effects during early life may endure into adulthood. This paper is the first to
follow birth cohorts over time to examine lasting mortality consequences associated with
Medicaid.
THEORY AND LITERATURE
The first research question adds to the literature by examining the overall changes
in infant mortality rate—recipients and non-recipients alike—associated with States’
Medicaid participation. Medicaid was one of the largest U.S. federal initiatives to
disseminate medical innovations and health information to pregnant women and infants
in the 1960s. By increasing the number of women who seek pre- and postnatal care,
Medicaid aimed to improve nutrition and health behaviors among expectant and new
mothers (David and Seigel 1983; Lee et al. 1980). This in turn would lead to healthier
infants and lower mortality rates among women who would not otherwise have had
access to health care. Medicaid targeted low-income women and infants, a group that was
more susceptible to infant mortality. Improving the health of this disadvantaged group
would effectively lower the average infant mortality for the overall population.
Medicaid may also have had spillover effects on women and infants who did not
gain insurance coverage from the public program. Theories in diffusion suggest that as a
greater proportion of women gain access to pre- and post-natal care, the health of all
women would improve. Health knowledge spreads through interpersonal networks as
well as institutional organizations (Backer 1991; Tarde 1962; Green et al. 2009).
Interaction with peers, friends, and family as well as health care providers influence how
individuals approach their health (Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2009; Glanz et al. 2008).
Social network effects on health behavior are not trivial. Groups of socially connected
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people quit smoking in concert at different times despite the already ‘generalized
knowledge’ of smoking’s adverse effects on health (Christakis and Fowler 2009).
Medicaid connects more women with health care providers and encourages transfer of
health knowledge from physicians to the public. As more women adopt good nutrition
and refrain from risky health behaviors, the more likely they are to influence other
women in their social networks, even those who always had access to health care
services.
Researchers, for the most part, agree that Medicaid increased insurance coverage
and prenatal care utilization, but many disagree on the program’s impact on population
health. While Medicaid fails to ensure that all persons who are eligible have health
insurance (Braveman et al. 1993; Currie and Grogger 2002; Holahan and Zedlewski
1991; Kenney and Haley 2001; Wilensky and Berk 1982), the introduction of the public
health insurance program visibly improved insurance coverage and health care utilization
in the United States. Prior to 1965, only half of low-income Americans had medicalcoverage (Copeland and Meier 1987) and despite having poorer health than their
wealthier counterparts, low-income individuals and families used fewer medical services
(Copeland and Meier 1987; Rowland et al. 1988; Wilensky and Berk 1982). In particular,
88% of upper-income women reported seeing a physician during the first trimester of
pregnancy compared to 58% of lower-income pregnant women (Andersen and Andersen
1967; Copeland and Meier 1987). By the late 1970s when most states had adopted
Medicaid, 24 million Americans and over a third of people in households with incomes
below 125% FPL received health insurance through Medicaid (Oberg and Polich 1988;
Wilensky and Berk 1982). Medicaid specifically targeted low-income pregnant women
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and infants and their enrollee characteristics reflected this trait (Wilensky and Berk
1982). Medicaid covered about three-quarters of low-income pregnant mothers and
children under the age of 5, reducing the rate of uninsurance for these target groups to
below the national average (Holahan and Zedlewski 1991). By 1980, the low-income
group was utilizing medical services (hospital stays and physician visits) at an equivalent
rate as the higher-income groups (Copeland and Meier 1987; Rowland et al. 1988;
Wilensky and Berk 1982).
Critics claim that greater insurance coverage and health care utilization through
Medicaid do not necessarily translate into improved population health. Medicaid
recipients may receive inferior medical care than those who are privately insured. The
low pay-out to health care providers who treat Medicaid patients incentivize doctors to
limit the number of Medicaid patients they are willing to accept (Decker 2012). Medicaid
patients find themselves waiting longer for care and having a narrower selection of
doctors (Bisgaier and Rhodes 2011; Merrick, et al. 2001). Several studies also show that
Medicaid patients receive poorer quality care and face worse outcomes from the same
doctor relative to comparable individuals with private insurance (Hwang et al. 2005;
Wang et al. 2004). Criticisms against Medicaid’s effectiveness do not stop at the
uninsured, low-income population that the program is designed to target. Medicaid
induces eligible people who already have private insurance to switch to the arguably
inferior public health insurance policy (Blumberg et al. 2000; Dubay and Kenney 1996;
Wilensky and Berk 1982). Some further claim that health care providers shift the cost of
caring for Medicaid patients onto privately insured patients (McDonough 2011).
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Empirically measuring the health outcome of Medicaid is tricky as socioeconomic
class—a well-established determinant of health (Cutler et al. 2008, Elo 2009; Link and
Phelan 1995; Lynch et al. 2004; Smith 2007)—is explicitly tied to eligibility (Lyken and
Jargowsky 2002). Copeland and Meier (1987) use Medicaid expenditures in their timeseries model to distinguish infant mortality decline attributable to increasing access to
care from technological advances in medicine. They find a significant negative
association between federal Medicaid expenditures and the infant mortality rate.
However, their simple study design was inadequate to establish a convincing relationship
between Medicaid and infant mortality. Grossman and Jacobowitz (1981) utilize
disparate Medicaid eligibility rules to estimate the change in county-level neonatal
mortality rate associated with the state’s Medicaid coverage. The paper attempts to
control for the composition differences between counties by estimating the proportion of
births to low-income mothers. They also include proportion of women with high-school
degrees and the number of physicians per 1000 to control for socioeconomic differences
between counties. Their analyses find little support for Medicaid in contributing to the
decline in neonatal mortality rates between 1964 and 1977. The limitation of this study
lies in its assumption that counties that share these few characteristics are essentially
equal, apart from the availability of Medicaid and other maternal and infant health
programs. Currie and Gruber (1994) find the most convincing evidence that Medicaid
expansions in the 1980s contributed to reductions in infant mortality rates. They
standardized States’ Medicaid expansions by simulating the proportion of women who
would be eligible from a nationally representative sample of 3,000 women from the
Current Population Survey each year. This method allowed the authors to effectively
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isolate the effects of States’ extent of Medicaid expansions from the composition of their
residents.
In sum, the introduction of Medicaid in 1965 led to a greater proportion of
pregnant women seeking prenatal care but the program’s contribution to overall
population health is unclear. The literature is mostly focused on determining Medicaid’s
health effects on its recipients. This paper contributes to this literature by examining
Medicaid’s impact on the entire population.
Population-level analyses of other high-income OECD countries show significant
associations between infant mortality and the country’s health care system. Countries
with publicly funded health care had lower infant mortality rates than similar countries
whose health care services are generally private (Elola et al. 1995). National health care
systems were associated with greater improvements in infant mortality after accounting
for secular declines and changes in GDP (Macinko et al 2004). Between 1970 and 1996,
public health care systems were associated with over 3 less infant deaths per 1000 live
births as IMR fell from 16.63 to 6.20 per 1000. These publicly funded national health
systems also attenuated the positive association between income inequality and infant
mortality (Macinko et al 2004). While Medicaid is not a national health system, it gave
access to public health care to a large subset of the US population. The program
specifically targeted groups who made large contributions to the national IMR. I expect
Medicaid to have similarly positive associations with infant mortality improvements in
the US.
The second part of this paper shows that cohorts who were born after their states
adopted Medicaid had greater improvements in probability of survival throughout
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childhood and into adulthood compared to cohorts born immediately prior to Medicaid.
Women who receive prenatal care and thus eat better and refrain from risky behaviors are
more likely to give birth to healthier babies (Almond 2005; Oreopolous et al. 2008).
These babies not only have higher chances of survival, but would also lead healthier lives
throughout childhood and adulthood. If Medicaid improves infant health by
disseminating health knowledge and behaviors to pregnant women, it would then lead to
healthier newborns who would grow up to be healthier adults.
While no study has examined the long-term consequences of being born into an
era of Medicaid, many studies have made the connection between prenatal and early-life
environmental conditions to later-life health outcomes. One of the most well-known of
these studies finds a positive link between ischemic health disease mortality and infant
mortality rates at the place and time of birth (Barker and Osmond 1986). Their study
suggests that early-life living conditions and nutrition (measured by local infant mortality
rates) have long-term consequences well into adulthood even when they move to another
region. Another study find higher mortality rates throughout the life course among
cohorts born during a macroeconomic recession (Van den Berg et al. 2006). Quasiexperimental studies also find poorer health outcomes among birth cohorts born during
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and the 1944 Dutch Famine relative to cohorts born
immediately before or after these sudden deteriorations in living conditions (Almond
2006; Roseboom et al. 2001). The literature is strongly suggestive of initial conditions at
birth having long-lasting health consequences. Medicaid explicitly aims to improve
prenatal health and birth outcomes. Thus, I expect these wide-spread efforts to translate
into improved health throughout the life-course.
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Before delving into the analyses, I briefly describe the historical decline in infant
mortality rates leading up to the advent of Medicaid and the policy context of States’
Medicaid participation during the period after 1965.
A rise in living standards, better nutrition, public sanitation, clean water supply,
and public health campaigns contributed to dramatic reductions in infant mortality rates
in the United States during the first half of the Twentieth Century (Condran and
Crimmins-Gardner 1978; Cutler and Miller 1995; Deaton and Paxton 2001; Elo and
Preston 1996; Ewbank and Preston 1990; Fogel 2004; McKeown 1976, 1979; Meeker
1972; Preston and Haines 1991; Szreter, 1988). After several decades of experiencing
significant improvements, the year-to-year decline in infant mortality stalled to 0.5
percent by 1950 (Corman and Grossman 1985). While mortality from common childhood
infectious diseases had reached very low levels by 1950 (Armstrong et al. 1999)
considerable national attention was focused on how infant health improvements in the US
were lagging behind other developed nations (Committee on Maternal and Child Care
1965; Falkner 1969; Lee et al. 1980; Shapiro et al. 1968). Many efforts were made to
improve prenatal and neonatal medical technology as well as to make services more
accessible (Corman and Grossman 1985). Medicaid, a means-tested public insurance
program targeting low-income pregnant women and infants, was created by Title XIX of
the Social Security Act in 1965. The period beginning 1965 experienced twentieth
century’s second surge of infant mortality decline (Grossman and Jacobowitz 1981; Lee
et al. 1980). Infant mortality declined 4.5 percent per year between 1965 and 1982
(Corman and Grossman 1985). Increased access to care through Medicaid is often
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credited as one of the contributors to the rapid decline in infant mortality rates in the
decade after 1965 (Corman and Grossman 1985; Mason 1991). But no prior study has
attempted to quantify mortality improvements due to Medicaid.
The analyses in this paper estimate the change in mortality decline associated with
Medicaid by comparing state’s annual mortality improvements pre- and post-Medicaid
participation. This regression discontinuity framework utilizes States’ differences in
when they adopted Medicaid. States began to join the federal Medicaid program over
sixteen years beginning in 1966, a year after Medicaid was created by the Social Security
Amendments of 1965.
The program gave federal grants to states to provide health insurance to eligible
persons. The federal government gave considerable flexibility in when or whether each
state could participate in the program. The federal government mandated participating
states to provide coverage to pregnant mothers and infants that met income and asset
requirements. The State and the federal government would be jointly responsible for the
costs associated with Medicaid. States began to participate in Medicaid quickly after the
Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965. Six states adopted Medicaid in
January1966. 20 more followed later that year. Eleven joined in 1967, one joined in 1968,
and by 1970, most of the states had adopted Medicaid.. Appendix A shows the dates of
when each State implemented Medicaid. Arizona is the last of the States to adopt
Medicaid in 1982. Appendix B displays the same data on the US map. The first states to
adopt Medicaid in January 1966 were located throughout the entire nation. States in the
Northeast were relatively early adopters except New Jersey who was among the last.
Southern states were generally late in adopting Medicaid with some exceptions such as
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Georgia, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. States’ timing of Medicaid adoption does not appear
to follow the 1964 presidential election results. Heavily republican states such as
Louisiana, Nebraska, Utah, Georgia, and Oklahoma were among the first to implement
Medicaid in 1966. Democratic New Jersey and Alaska were among the last. I later show
in my analysis that the timing had little bearing on states’ mortality improvements after
Medicaid adoption.
States’ timing of Medicaid implementation was also different from other public
policies that the Johnson administration introduced to combat poverty in the 1960s and
1970s. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 was the other major initiative targeting women and
children to improve prenatal health and reduce infant mortality (Almond et al. 2011).
However, the rollout of the Food Stamp Program did not coincide with states’ Medicaid
implementation dates. The Food Stamp Program was implemented at the county-level
and its implementation stretched out between 1961 and 1976. Thirty percent of the US
population already had access to food stamps by the time the first states began to offer
Medicaid in January 1966. About a quarter of the population gained access to food
stamps after 1970 when all but two states had joined the Medicaid program. Furthermore,
states’ Medicaid participation had little bearing on its counties’ food stamp participation
start date. Most notably, most counties in New York, Oklahoma, and Massachusetts
began to offer food stamps relatively late, despite being early adopters of Medicaid.
Many counties in Texas and California did not offer food stamps till after 1970. Thus, the
exact timing of Medicaid implementation appears exogenous to other prenatal and infant
health policy initiatives that occurred during this period.
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DATA
I rely on the US Vital Statistics micro-data from the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS) for my analyses. I examine the mortality patterns for birth cohorts born between
1959 and 1979—the 20-year period surrounding the introduction of Medicaid in 1965. I
start my analysis in 1959 when Hawaii became the last state to join the US. I use the
natality micro-data for births between 1959 and 1979 to calculate the number of births by
year for each state. The NCHS allocates births to the state of the mother’s residence and
does not include births to US citizens outside the United States. To derive the agespecific mortality rates for cohorts born between 1959 and 1979, I use the mortality
micro data from 1959 to 2010. The NCHS constructed the mortality microdata from
death certificates filed in vital statistics offices of each State. Mortality data for New
Jersery is missing for the years, 1962 and 1963. In 1972, NCHS processed only a 50
percent sample of death records. I have multiplied the number of deaths in 1972 by a
factor of two in my analyses.
I limit the analyses in this paper to the white US population. The US Vital
Statistics changed the way it categorized race in their birth and death certificates in 1968.
Prior to 1968, people were categorized as either white or non-white. After 1968, the nonwhite population was classified into sub-groups. The exact list of sub-groups changed
multiple times between 1968 and 2010. The changes in how the data classifies race
makes it difficult to compare minority groups across the years. In addition, the number of
non-white being born and dying in some states were so small that the age-specific
mortality rates quickly became unreliable.
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY
I exploit the variation in State’s timing of Medicaid participation to examine the
improvements in US mortality rates attributed to the public insurance program. I estimate
the change in the annual rate of mortality decline after Medicaid adoption using state
fixed effects weighted by the number of births from each state. All regression models
have panel-corrected standard errors and they also correct for heteroskedasticity. This
method relies on Medicaid adoption timing to be exogenous to other factors that may
influence mortality rates. I evaluate several factors that may undermine this framework.
First, states’ baseline infant mortality in 1965 had no relation to when they joined
the Medicaid program. Utah who had the lowest infant mortality rate adopted Medicaid at
the same time as West Virginia who had the highest infant mortality. A low correlation
coefficient across all states further confirms that states’ infant mortality rates in 1965 did
not determine its Medicaid participation.
Second, Medicaid adoption year did not determine how much improvement a
state experienced after participation. I separately examined each state’s change in the rate
of infant mortality decline after Medicaid implementation. Implementation year was not
correlated with the magnitude or significance of their IMR improvements. For example,
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa all experienced statistically significant IMR improvements of
about -0.53 deaths per 1000 per year after they adopted Medicaid. Their adoption dates
were 1966, 1970, and 1968 respectively. Thirty-three out of the forty-eight states that
joined Medicaid prior to 1970 had a statistically significant infant mortality improvement
that coincided with their Medicaid participation years. And, these thirty-three states’
Medicaid adoption dates were spread across all four years between 1966 and 1970.
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Third, systematic migration of would-be mothers of healthy babies into states
offering Medicaid is unlikely. Interstate migration flows of a demographic group that
would produce the healthiest babies (college-educated persons between the ages 25 to 39)
have no relations to States’ timing of Medicaid participation. California, an early
adopter, and Florida, a late adopter, were among the top recipients of the young, college
educated population in the late 1960s (Goworowska and Gardner 2012). Young, single,
college-educated people consistently out-migrated from Minnesota and Alabama despite
one being an early Medicaid adopter and the other, a late adopter. Furthermore, the
magnitudes of these flows are small. Thirteen percent of persons aged 25 to 39 moved to
a different state between 1965 and 1970. Out of the thirteen percent, less than thirty
percent were college educated.
Lastly, infant mortality rate declines associated with state Medicaid participation
remain significant, independent of period-specific effects. The stalling infant mortality
improvements in the 1950s and early 1960s drew the attention of policy makers. The
federal enactment of the Medicaid program was accompanied by increased funding to the
NIH for prenatal and neonatal research (Shapiro 1981). An influential medical innovation
that coincides with several states’ Medicaid adoption can overstate IMR improvements
attributed to Medicaid. To test this, I add a term to indicate whether the birth occurred
before or after a particular year between 1960 and 1970 in a series of regressions. For
example, the first of this series will add infant mortality rate on a dummy variable for
post-1960 births to the original model. The inclusion of these terms did not substantially
change the magnitude or the significance of infant mortality reductions attributed to State
Medicaid participation.
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RESULTS
Research Question 1: Is Medicaid associated with greater declines in US infant mortality
rates?
I examine the change in the annual rate of infant mortality decline after States’
implementation of Medicaid to address my first research question. I calculate the infant
mortality rate for each state and year between 1959 and 1979 as follows.
IMRy,s = Number of deaths for infants under age one residing in state s, in year y / 1000
live births to mothers who are residents of state s, in year y
Figure 2.1 shows the declining trend of US infant mortality rates between 1959
and 1979. Confirming prior studies (Corman and Grossman 1985; Grossman and
Jacobowitz 1981; Lee et al. 1980) the national infant mortality rate shows an accelerated
decline during the period after 1965. The infant mortality rate decreased on average 1.2
percent (at a rate of 0.28 infant deaths /1000 live births) per year between 1959 and 1965.
Between 1965 and 1979, the infant mortality rate decreased 4.4 percent (0.72 infant
deaths/1000 live births) per year. It is also during this latter period that States began to
participate in the federal Medicaid program. Six States were the first to implement
Medicaid in January 1966. Twenty more joined by the end of the year and eleven States
implemented Medicaid the following year in 1967. By 1970, 48 States were offering
Medicaid to their residents.
In Figure 2.2, I show the changes in the annual rates of infant mortality after
Medicaid implementation for each state. The sizes of the circles in the graph represent the
number of births. Both large and small states saw significant mortality improvements
after Medicaid. And these improvements do not depend on which year the states joined
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the program. Thirty-three out of 50 states experienced faster declines in infant mortality
after Medicaid. Montana, Idaho, Mississippi, West Virginia and the New England states
experienced the largest improvements. The two largest states, New York and California,
saw moderate improvements. The 17 states that did not have significant improvements in
infant mortality are scattered throughout the West, Midwest, and the South. Texas is the
largest state that did not appear to have faster mortality declines after Medicaid adoption.
Figure 2.3 descriptively shows faster improvements in infant mortality after each
state’s Medicaid implementation relative to the years leading up to Medicaid. The graph
shows average logged ratios (weighted by number of live births) of IMR relative to the
IMR the year before Medicaid took effect. Figure 2.3 accounts for variations in states’
timing of Medicaid and their baseline IMR levels. The rate of IMR decline appears to be
almost three times as fast during the seven years following Medicaid than during the
seven year leading up to the program’s implementation.
Table 2.1 describes the weighted yearly rate of decline in infant mortality during
the years before and after States’ Medicaid participation. Infant mortality declined at a
rate of 0.38 deaths per 1000 births per year during the years before Medicaid
implementation. This rate increased to 0.71 deaths per 1000 births per year after the
introduction of Medicaid. The model estimates incremental mortality improvement of
0.33 deaths per 1000 births per year after Medicaid implementation. All coefficients are
significant at the 0.001 level. The mortality improvements associated with Medicaid
adoption is not trivial. Had infant mortality improvements stayed constant at preMedicaid rates, the IMR among US whites would be 15.57 in 1979—about 4.11 deaths
per 1000 in excess of the estimated 11.46 with the presence of Medicaid (Figure 2.2).
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This translates to approximately 78,000 white babies between 1966 and 1979 that would
have not survived infanthood.

Research Question 2: Did the availability of Medicaid at birth have lasting consequences
on mortality throughout childhood and into adulthood?
To address my second research question, I examine changes in the cumulative mortality
between cohorts born before and after Medicaid in ten-year age periods. The eldest age
group in this analysis is the 30 to 39 age period. I calculate age-specific mortality
probabilities from life tables of cohorts born between 1959 and 1979. I then derive the
cumulative mortality probabilities for each ten-year age period from each birth cohort.
Figure 2.4 shows the mortality trends of cohorts born between 1959 and 1979 by ten-year
age periods. Unlike infant mortality, mortality for older age groups did not experience
steady and constant declines during this period. In fact, mortality rates appear to increase
after 1970 (Murphy et al. 2013). Mortality data ends in 2010 when the 1970 birth cohort
is 40 years old. Constricted by data limitations and possible confounding effects from
later mortality trends, I limit this section of the analysis to the 1959-1970 birth cohorts.
All states except Arizona and Alaska had implemented Medicaid by the end of 1970.
I estimate the change in mortality probability associated with the availability of
Medicaid in the state at the time of birth. The regressions also include state fixed-effects
with panel-corrected standard errors and corrections for heteroskedasticity. All age
groups displayed improvements in mortality associated with the availability of Medicaid
at birth. Table 2.2 presents the change in the annual rate of mortality improvement
associated with Medicaid implementation at the state level. All coefficients in Table 2.2
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are significant at the 0.001 level. Cohorts born after Medicaid became available in their
states experienced greater rates of mortality improvements at all age groups than cohorts
born prior to Medicaid implementation. The largest differences between the pre- and
post-Medicaid cohorts appear in the 1-9 and 20-29 age groups. The cumulative mortality
improvement rate increased by over 300 percent from 0.005 to 0.022 and 0.01 to 0.034
percent per year respectively. While not as large, the rate of mortality decline at ages 10
to 19 and 30 to 39 still accelerated significantly after Medicaid implementation. The
annual rate of improvement increased from 0.011 to 0.017 and 0.023 to 0.044 percent per
year respectively. Figure 2.5 presents expected mortality probabilities for cohorts born
between 1964 and 1970 with and without the estimated effects of Medicaid. The
mortality probabilities are lower in predictions that account for Medicaid in all four age
groups and the differences becomes larger in more recent cohorts.
These percentage differences may appear small but their implication on the US
population is substantial. The final component of this paper show how the 1970 birth
cohort would differ without the mortality effects of Medicaid estimated in the prior
models. Table 2.3 presents the 1970 cohort’s predicted under-40 mortality schedule with
and without the estimated effects of Medicaid. The number of survivors at the beginning
of each age group (lx) is based on the actual number of white births in the United States
in 1970. I apply the different age-specific mortality probabilities to the 1970 birth cohort
and compare the resulting number of survivors at age 40 in 2010. Without mortality
improvements associated with Medicaid, out of the 3.1 million people born in 1970,
13,681 fewer people would be alive in 2010. 13,681 people represent an 8.7 percent
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increase in under-40 mortality for the 1970 cohort and 0.4 percent of all live births in
1970.
LIMITATIONS
The analysis is presented in the paper has several limitations. First, the analysis is limited
to the US white population. The poor data quality for the non-white population in the late
1950s and 1960s does not produce dependable results. Many states during this period had
very few non-white births and even fewer deaths. Age-specific death rates deteriorate
into noisy trends for many smaller states. In addition, the NCHS changed the
categorization of non-whites several times during this period. As the immigrant
population grew in the 1960s and 1970s, the Vital Statistics separated Hispanics and
Asians from the African American population. During the early years, all non-white
racial and ethnic groups were reported as simply, non-white. Medicaid likely had a
greater influence on the non-white population. A greater proportion of non-whites would
have been eligible for Medicaid as poverty and single motherhood were more prevalent.
Infant mortality among non-whites during this period was also substantially higher and
increasing their access to medical care may have had a greater impact on infant mortality.
Given these considerations, the changes in US mortality attributed to Medicaid in this
paper may be a conservative estimate of its actual effect.
The second limitation is the analyses’ assumption that deaths occurred in the state
of the person’s birth. I derive the age-specific death rates using actual number of deaths
by year, age, and state and the cohort’s corresponding number of births in the same state.
These age-specific death rates inflate from deaths of persons born out-of-state and deflate
when the net-migration of people born in those states are below zero. Limiting the
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analysis to the white population has substantially reduced inflation from the large growth
of immigration into the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Immigration from
Europe and Canada remained relatively constant during this period at rate of
approximately 100,000 per year (Fix et al. 1994). The cumulative number of these
immigrants would have been less than 1% of the US population in 1990. Furthermore,
they would have contributed even less to mortality at younger ages which is the focus of
this paper. Moving to another state after birth can also affect States’ mortality schedules.
It is unlikely that migration patterns coincide with the availability of Medicaid at a
person’s time of birth. Migration between states would more likely dilute the estimated
effects of Medicaid on mortality making this paper’s results conservative.
This study is also limited by the length of its data. The 1965 birth cohort is only
45 years old in 2010 and the lasting effects of Medicaid could only be observed at
relatively low mortality ages. Prior literature suggests that the effects of early-life health
environment become more prominent at older ages when mortality rates increase.
Similarly, the association between Medicaid availability at birth and adult mortality may
become stronger in later years.
DISCUSSION
Faster declines in infant mortality accompanied the advent of Medicaid in the late 1960s.
These improvements associated with the federal public insurance program were
substantial. The results from this paper’s analysis show that the annual rate of infant
mortality decline doubled after states’ Medicaid participation. It made an impact on the
overall population health by targeting women and infants who had the least access to
health care and the highest levels of infant mortality. Improving the health of the neediest
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group raised the average survival rate of the overall population. Moreover, Medicaid may
also have had a positive health impact on women and infants who did not directly benefit
from the public program. It served as a conduit for health knowledge to travel from
researchers and physicians to the general public. As more women interacted with the
medical system and changed their health beliefs and behavior, they reinforced the health
knowledge of other women. Medicaid enhanced concurrent public health initiatives to
reduce infant mortality. Combined, these factors lead to the large infant mortality
improvements observed in the United States in the period after 1965.
The health impact of Medicaid in-utero and in infanthood was significant enough
to yield later-life consequences. Cohorts born after their States adopted Medicaid
experienced greater mortality decline throughout childhood and into adulthood, well past
their eligible age. In fact, mortality improvements associated with Medicaid are greater at
older age groups. This paper draws attention to the significance of early life access to
health care in-utero and during infanthood in improving population health throughout the
life-course.
These findings suggest what the United States may expect after the rollout of the
Affordable Care Act. Proposed Medicaid expansions will provide access to estimated
17million adults who currently live without health care coverage. Younger adults who
comprise a large proportion of the uninsured would be most impacted by these
expansions. These adults will have better access to care and have more frequent
interactions with health care providers. In a similar manner to pregnant women and
prenatal care, people who have greater interaction with health care providers are more
likely to have better personal health behaviors and practices (Andersen 1995; Kiefe et al.
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1998). Increasing access to health care through the ACA will connect more people to
health care providers and services. These people will adopt healthier behaviors and in
turn, will reinforce good practices and behaviors in their communities.
Better health behaviors in earlier adulthood also have lasting consequences in
later life health and mortality. Adapting healthy behaviors such as refraining from
smoking, engaging in physical activity, and having sound dietary habits lead to lower
morbidity and mortality (Daneai et al. 2009). Just as an increase in insurance coverage
among pregnant women had lasting mortality consequences on their children, an increase
in insurance coverage among young, healthy adults may lead to a healthier older
population.

70

REFERENCES
Almond, D. (2006). Is the 1918 influenza pandemic over? Long-term effects of in utero
influenza exposure in the post-1940 U.S. population. Journal of Political
Economy, 114, 672-712.
Almond, D., Chay, K., & Lee, D. (2005). The costs of low birth weight. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 120, 1031-1083.
Almond, D., Hoynes, H. W., & Schanzenbach, D. W. (2011). Inside the war on poverty:
the impact of food stamps on birth outcomes. The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 93, 387-403.
Andersen, R. (1995). Revisiting the behavioral model and access to medical care: Does it
matter? Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 36, 1-10.
Andersen, R. & Andersen, O. W. (1967). A decade of health services: social survey
trends in use and expenditure. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Armstrong, G., Conn, L., & Pinner, R. (1999). Trends in infectious disease mortality in
the United States during the 20th century. JAMA, 281, 61-66
Backer, T. E. (1991). Knowledge utilization: the third wave. Knowledge 12, 255-340.
Baldwin, L. M., Larson, E. H., Connell, F. A., Nordlund, D., Cain, K. C., Cawthon, M.
L., Byrns, P., & Rosenblatt, R. A. (1998). The effect of expanding Medicaid
prenatal services on birth outcomes. American Journal of Public Health, 88, 16231629
Barker, D. J. P. & Osmond, C. (1986). Infant mortality, childhood nutrition, and
ischaemic heart disease in England and Wales. The Lancet, May 10, 1077-1081.

71

Bisgaier, J. & Rhodes, K. V. (2011). Auditing access to specialty care for children with
public insurance. New England Journal of Medicine, 364, 2324-2333
Braveman, P., Bennett, T., Lewis, C., Egerter, S., & Showstack, J. (1993). Access to
prenatal care following major Medicaid eligibility expansions. JAMA, 269(10),
1285-1289.
Blumberg, L. J., Dubay, L., & Norton, S. (2000). Did the Medicaid expansions for
children displace private insurance? An analysis using the SIPP. Journal of Health
Economics, 19, 33-60.
Christakis, N. A. & Fowler, J. H. (2007). The spread of obesity in a large social network
over 32 years. New England Journal of Medicine, 357, 370-379.
Christakis, N. A. & Fowler, J. H. (2009). The collective dynamics of smoking in a large
social network. New England Journal of Medicine, 358, 2249-2258.
Committee on Maternal and Child Care. (1965). Reducing infant mortality: suggested
approaches. JAMA 193, 310-319.
Corman, H. & Grossman, M. (1985). Determinants of neonatal mortality rates in the
U.S.: A reduced form model. Journal of Health Economics , 4, 213 – 236
Condran, G.A. & Crimmins-Gardner, E. (1978). Public health measures and mortality in
U.S. cities in the late Nineteenth Century. Human Ecology, 6, 27-54.
Congressional Budget Office. (2011). CBO’s analysis of the major health care legislation
enacted in March 2010. Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf before the
Subcommittee on Health Committee on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of
Representatives.

72

Copeland, G. W. & Meier, K. J. (1987). Gaining ground: The impact of Medicaid and
WIC on infant mortality. American Politics Research, 15, 254-273
Currie, J., & Grogger, J. (2002). Medicaid expansions and welfare contractions:
offsetting effects on prenatal care and infant health? Journal of Health Economics,
21, 313-335.
Currie, J. & Gruber, J. (1996). Saving babies: The efficacy and cost of recent changes in
the Medicaid eligibility of pregnant women. Journal of Political Economy, 104,
1263-1296.
Cutler, D., Lleras-Muney, A., & Vogl, T. (2008). Socioeconomic status and health:
dimensions and mechanisms. NBER Working Paper 14333.
Cutler, D. & Miller, G. (2005). The role of public health improvements in health
advances: The Twentieth-Century United States. Demography, 42, 1-22.
Daneai, G. D., Ding, E. L., Mozaffarian D., Taylor B., Rehm J., Murray, C., & Ezzati, M.
(2009). The preventable causes of death in the United States: Comparative risk
assessment of dietary, lifestyle, and metabolic risk factors. PLoS Med 6(4):
e1000058. doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.1000058
David, R. J. & Siegel, E. (1983). Decline in neonatal mortality, 1968 to 1977: Better
babies or better care? Pediatrics, 71, 531-540.
Deaton, A. & Paxson, C. (2001). Mortality, education, income, and inequality among
American cohorts. Pp. 129-70 in Themes in the economics of aging, edited by
D.A. Wise. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Decker, S. L. (2012). In 2011 nearly one-third of physicians said they would not accept
new Medicaid patients, but rising fees may help. Health Affairs, 31, 1673-1679.

73

Devaney, B., Bilheimer, L., & Schore, J. (1992). Medicaid costs and birth outcomes: The
effects of prenatal WIC participation and the use of prenatal care. Journal of
Policy Analysis and Management, 11, 573-592.
Dubay, L. C., & Kenney, G. M. (1996). The effects of Medicaid expansions on insurance
coverage of children. The Future of Children, 6, 152-161.
Elo, I. (2009). Social class differentials in health and mortality: patterns and explanations
in comparative perspective. Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 553-72.
Elo, L. T. & Preston, S.H. (1996). Educational Differentials in Mortality: United States,
1979- 1985. Social Science and Medicine, 42, 47-57
Elola, J., Daponte, A., & Navarro, V. (1995). Health indicators and the organization of
health care systems in Western Europe. American Journal of Public Health, 85,
1397-1401.
Ewbank, D.C. & Preston S. H. (1990). Personal health behaviour and the decline in infant
and child mortality: The United States, 1900-1930. Pp. 116-50 in What we know
about health transition: The culture, social and behavioural determinants of health,
Volume 1, edited by J. Caldwell. Canberra: Australian National University
Printing Service.
Falkner, F.T. (ed) (1969). Key Issues in Reducing Infant Mortality: Report of a
Conference. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Fix, M., Passel, J. S., Enchautegui, M. E., & Zimmerman, W. (1994). Immigration and
immigrants: Setting the record straight. Washington DC: Urban Institute.
Fogel, R. W. (2004). The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-2100: Europe,
America, and the Third World.

74

Glanz, K., Rimer, B., & Viswanath, K. (2008). Health behavior and health education:
theory, research, and practice. Wiley.
Goworowska, J. & Gardner, T. K. (2012). Historical migration of the young, single, and
college educated: 1965 to 2000. Population Division Working Paper No. 94, U.S.
Census Bureau.
Green, L., Ottoson, J. M., Garcia, C., & Hiatt, R.A. (2009). Diffusion theory and
knowledge dissemination, utilization, and integration in public health. Annual
Review of Public Health, 2009, 30, 151-174.
Grossman, M. & Jacobowitz, S. (1981). Variations in infant mortality rates among
counties of the United States: The roles of public policies and programs.
Demography, 18, 695-713.
Gruber, J. (2003). Medicaid. In Means-tested transfer programs in the United States. Ed.
Robert A. Moffitt. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Guyer, B. (1990). Medicaid and prenatal care: necessary but not sufficient. JAMA, 264,
2264-2265.
Holahan, J. & Zedlewski, S. (1991). Expanding Medicaid to cover uninsured Americans.
Health Affairs, 10, 45-61.
Howell, E. M. (2001). The impact of the Medicaid expansions for pregnant women: a
synthesis of the evidence. Medical Care Research and Review, 58, 3-30.
Hwang, A., Hwang, M., Xie, H., Hardy, B., & Skaggs B. (2005). Access to urologic care
for children in California: Medicaid versus private insurance. Urology 65, 170–
173.

75

Kaiser Family Foundation. (2013). What is Medicaid’s impact on access to care, health
outcomes, and quality of care? Setting the Record Straight on the Evidence. Issue
Brief
Kenney, G. & Haley, J. (2001). Why aren’t more uninsured children enrolled in Medicaid
or SCHIP? Urban Institute, Series B, No. B-35.
Keife, C., Williams, D., Greenlund, K., Ulene, V., Gardin, J. M., & Raczynski, J. M.
(1998). Health care access and seven-year change in cigarette smoking: the
CARDIA study. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 15, 146-154.
Lee, K. S., Paneth, N., Gartner, L. M., Pearlman, M. A., & Gruss, L. (1980). Neonatal
mortality: an analysis of the recent improvement in the United States. American
Journal of Public Health, 70, 15-21.
Link, B. G. & Phelan, J. (1995). Social conditions as fundamental causes of disease.
Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 35, 80-94.
Lykens, K. A. & Jargowsky, P. A. (2002). Medicaid matters: children's health and
Medicaid eligibility expansions. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 21,
219-238.
Lynch, J., Smith, D. G., Harper, S., Hillemeier, M., Ross, N., Kaplan, G. A. & Wolfson,
M. (2004). Is income inequality a determinant of population health? Part 1. a
systematic review. Milbank Quarterly, 82, 5-99.
Macinko, J. A., Shi, L., & Starfield, B. (2004). Wage inequality, the health system, and
infant mortality in wealthy industrialized countries, 1970-1996. Social Science
and Medicine, 58, 279-292.

76

Mason, J. (1991). Reducing infant mortality in the United States through "Healthy Start".
Public Health Report, 106, 479-483
McDonough, J. E. (2011). Inside National Health Reform. Berkley, CA: University of
California Press.
McKeown, T. (1976). The modern rise of population, New York: Academic Press
McKeown, T. (1979). Role of medicine: Dream, mirage, or nemesis. Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Meeker, E. (1972). The improving health of the United States, 1850-1915. Explorations
in Economic History, 10, 353-73.
Merrick, N., Houchens, R., Tillisch, S., & Berlow, B. (2001). Quality of hospital care of
children with asthma: Medicaid versus privately insured patients. Journal of
Health Care for the Poor and Underserved, 12, 192–207.
Moss, N. & Carver, K. (1998). The effect of WIC and Medicaid on infant mortality in the
United States. American Journal of Public Health, 88, 1354-1361.
Murphy, S. L., Xu, J., & Kochanek, K. (2013). Deaths: Final data for 2010. National
Vital Statistics Reports. US Department of Health and Human Services
Oberg, C. N. and Polich, C. L. (1988). Medicaid: entering the third decade. Health
Affairs, 7, 83-96.
Oreopolous, P., Stabile, M., Walld, R., & Roos, L. L. (2008). Short-, medium-, and longterm consequences of poor infant health: An analysis using siblings and twins.
The Journal of Human Resources, 43, 88-138.
Preston, S. & M. Haines. (1991). Fatal years: Child mortality in late Nineteenth-Century
America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

77

Roseboom, T., van der Meulen, J. H. P., Ravelli, C. J., Osmond, C., Barker, D. J. P., &
Bleker, O. P. (2001). Effects of prenatal exposure to the Dutch famine on adult
disease in late life: an overview. Molecular and Cellular Endocrinology, 185, 9398.
Rowland, D., Lyons, B., & Edwards, J. (1988). Medicaid: Health care for the poor in the
Reagan era. Annual Review of Public Health, 9, 427-450
Schor, E. L., Abrams, M., & Shea, K. (2007). Medicaid: Health promotion and disease
prevention for school readiness. Health Affairs, 420-429.
Shapiro, S. (1981). New reductions in infant mortality: The challenge of low birth
weight. American Journal of Public Health, 71, 365-366.
Shapiro, S., Schlesinger, E. R., & Nesbitt, R. E. L. (1968). Infant, perinatal, maternal and
childhood mortality in the United States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Smith, J. P. (2007). The impact of socioeconomic status on health over the life-course.
Journal of Human Resources, 4, 739-764.
Szreter, S. (1988). The importance of social intervention in Britain’s mortality decline
c.1850-1914: A re-interpretation of the role of public health. Social History of
Medicine 1, 1–38.
Tarde, G. (1962). Laws of Imitation. Gloucester MA: H. Holt.
Van den Berg, G. J., Lindeboom, M., & Portrait, F. (2006). Economic conditions early in
life and individual mortality. American Economic Review, 96, 290-302.
Wang, E., Choe, M., Meara, J., & Koempel, J. (2004). Inequality of access to surgical
specialty health care: why children with government-funded insurance have less

78

access than those with private insurance in Southern California. Pediatrics, 114,
584–590.
Wilensky, G., & Berk, M. L. (1982). Health care, the poor, and the role of Medicaid.
Health Affairs, 1, 93-100.

79

Infant mortality rates in the United States, 1959-1979
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Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Scatter plot represents fifty states excluding the
District of Columbia. National Infant Mortality Rate weighted by the number of births in each state.
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Fig. 2.2 Annual improvements in infant mortality associated with Medicaid
implementation by State

Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Scatter plot represents fifty states excluding the
District of Columbia. Data point sizes represent the number of births in 1965.
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Notes: Calculations are limited to the white population. Calculations are weighted by the number of births.
Values are average logged ratio of states’ infant mortality rates relative to the year immediately prior to
Medicaid implementation.
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Table 2.1 Annual change in state infant mortality rate regressed on timing of Medicaid participation
Number of years since Medicaid implementation in state at birth a

-0.326 ***

Birth year b

-0.382 ***

Constant

23.22

R-Squared

0.98

Infant mortality trends before and after Medicaid implementation estimated from coefficients
Annual rate of IMR decline in years before Medicaid

-0.382

Annual rate of IMR decline in years after Medicaid c

-0.708

Notes: IMR units are in infant deaths per 1000 live births. Regression model includes state fixed-effects and weighted by the number of births in given year. Data
is limited to the US white population. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedastic panels.
a Years prior to Medicaid implementation is set to zero
b Represented as years since 1959
c Calculated as the sum of coefficients, a and b
*p < 0.5, **p < 0.01, ***p<0.001
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Fig. 2.4

Expected US infant mortality rates with and without Medicaid
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Notes: Estimates are based on coefficients from Table 2.1. Data is limited to the US white Population. Values are weighted by the number of births in each state
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Cumulative mortality probabilities by ten-year age group and birth year
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Notes: Data is limited to the US white population. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying for each birth cohort living through each ten-year
age period.
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Table 2.2

Annual change in cumulative mortality probabilities regressed on timing of Medicaid participation (%)
Age 1-9

Age 10-19

Age 20-29

Age 30-39

Number of years since Medicaid implementation in state at birth a

-0.017

-0.006

-0.034

-0.021

Birth year b

-0.005

-0.011

-0.010

-0.023

0.561

0.718

1.215

1.622

0.87

0.87

0.85

0.70

Annual rate of mortality probability decline for cohorts born before Medicaid

-0.005

-0.011

-0.010

-0.023

c

-0.022

-0.017

-0.043

-0.044

Constant
R-Squared
Mortality trends for cohorts born before and after Medicaid implementation

Annual rate of mortality probability decline for cohorts born after Medicaid

Notes: All coefficients are significant at the alpha 0.001 level. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying within each ten-year age group.
Regression model includes state fixed-effects and is weighted by the number of births in given year. Data is limited to the US white population. Standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedastic panels.
a Years prior to Medicaid implementation is set to zero
b Represented as years since 1959
c Calculated as the sum of coefficients, a and b
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Fig. 2.6

Expected cumulative mortality probabilities with and without Medicaid by age group
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Notes: Analysis is limited to US white population. Mortality probabilities are cumulative probabilities of dying for each birth cohort living through each ten-year
age period. Estimates are based on coefficients presented in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.3 Predicted population with and without Medicaid, 1970 birth cohort
Without Medicaid

With Medicaid

x

nqx (%)

ndx

lx

nqx (%)

ndx

lx

0-1

2.06

63,488

3,089,212

1.89

58,371

3,089,212

1-9

0.50

15,159

3,025,724

0.44

13,254

3,030,841

10-19

0.60

18,022

3,010,565

0.57

17,325

3,017,586

20-29

1.11

33,171

2,992,542

0.98

29,437

3,000,262

30-39

1.37

40,454

2,959,371

1.29

38,226

2,970,825

40

2,918,917

Excess under 40 mortality in 1970 cohort without Medicaid (2,918,917 - 2,932,598)

2,932,598
13,681

Notes: Data is limited to the US white population. Life tables use actual number of births in 1970 as the radix. nqx is based on mortality probabilities estimated in
Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
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Table 2.4 Medicaid implementation dates
Implementation Month and Year

State

January 1966

Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania

March 1966

California

May 1966

New York

July 1966

Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin

September 1966

Massachusetts

October 1966

Delaware, Michigan

December 1966

New Mexico

July 1967

Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Wyoming

September 1967

Texas

October 1967

Georgia, Missouri, South Dakota

July 1968

South Carolina

January 1969

Colorado, Tennessee

July 1969

Virginia

January 1970

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, Mississippi,
New Jersey, North Carolina

July 1972

Alaska

October 1982

Arizona

Source: Gruber (2003)
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Fig. 2.7 Medicaid implementation timing

Notes: States joined the Medicaid program between January 1966 and October 1982. 48 out of 50 states implemented Medicaid prior to 1971.
Light shades indicate early adoption and dark shares indicate late adoption.
Source: Gruber (2003)
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Chapter 3: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Insurance Coverage:
Dynamics of gaining and losing coverage over the life-course

ABSTRACT
Health insurance coverage varies substantially between racial and ethnic groups in the
United States. Current health care reforms attempt to reduce this gap by offering
government subsidies and expanding Medicaid to eligible persons. By centering the
discourse on insuring the uninsured, policymakers and scholars neglect to consider the
dynamic nature of gaining and losing insurance. I simulate the expected number of years
without health insurance coverage before becoming eligible for Medicare at 65 for nonHispanic whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. I derive age-specific rates of
insurance gain and loss from the 2008 Panel of the Income and Program Participation
(N= 114,345) to construct increment-decrement life tables. The expected number of years
to live uninsured for whites is 8 years. In comparison, African Americans are expected to
live 13 years, Hispanics 22 years, and Asians 11 years uninsured before reaching
Medicare eligibility. I decompose this racial and ethnic disparity in expected coverage
and find that the disparity is largely driven by minority groups’ greater propensity to lose
the health insurance that they already have. Increasing insurance-security to non-Hispanic
white levels among minority groups will reduce the number of years uninsured by about
50% for African Americans and Hispanics, and by 23% for Asians.
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Racial and ethnic disparities in health insurance coverage rates account for a
sizable share of the difference in access to health care (Lillie-Blanton and Hoffman
2005). African American and Hispanic individuals in the United States are more likely to
be uninsured at any given moment than non-Hispanic individuals (Kirby and Kaneda
2010). Without insurance, people face considerable barriers in receiving health services.
The uninsured have a limited source of care as many health care providers require
insurance coverage from their patients and face prohibitively high costs when they do
receive care (Himmelstein et al. 2005; Institute of Medicine 2002; Kasper et al. 2000;
Nelson et al. 1999; Zuekas & Weinick 1999). Inconsistent or unstable insurance coverage
also have negative consequences on the health care. Patients who frequently change
health care providers due to insurance loss or change experience more interruptions in
their care and are less likely to establish ongoing relationships with their physicians.
Efforts to decrease health disparities between racial and ethnic groups must
identify and reduce factors that cause African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians to have
greater uninsurance rates relative to non-Hispanic whites. Prior literature has identified
socioeconomic characteristics—income, employment, citizenship, and language—
associated with uninsurance that are more prevalent in minority populations. All these
factors are presented as barriers to acquiring health insurance. Few studies acknowledge
that high uninsurance rates can occur in populations due to the greater frequency in which
people lose insurance. Even fewer studies, if any, account for how the changing dynamics
of gaining and losing insurance across the life-course contributes to overall racial and
ethnic disparities in insurance coverage rates.

92

This paper simulates insurance coverage for African Americans, Hispanics, and
Asians from birth till age 65 and examines how the differences in rates of loss and gain at
various ages contribute to their lower insurance coverage relative to non-Hispanic whites.
Specifically, I address three research questions.
1.

How much of between-race/ethnic disparity is explained by differences in rates
of insurance gain? How much of it is explained insurance loss?

2.

How do the dynamics of losing and gaining insurance contribute to the disparity
across the life-course?

3.

What is the expected number of years to live uninsured among minorities if they
had the same rates of insurance gain or loss of non-Hispanic whites?
The findings shed light on how much recent health reforms will reduce coverage

gaps between minority groups and the white population. I decompose the overall racial
and ethnic disparity into insurance gain and insurance loss controlling for mortality rates
to determine the impact of policies targeted towards making insurance more accessible to
disadvantaged populations.
Overall, about 19 percent of the non-elderly US population is uninsured
(Clemens-Cope et al. 2012) but the prevalence of uninsurance differs substantially by
race or ethnic group. About twenty-percent of African Americans are uninsured. In
comparison non-Hispanic whites have an uninsurance rate of about thirteen percent (KFF
2013). About 18 percent of Asians are not insured. Hispanics have the higher prevalence
of uninsurance; about a third of Hispanics living in the United States are without health
insurance. Researchers cite low income and propensity to work in jobs with no health
insurance benefits as the primary cause for high uninsurance rates among African

93

Americans (Institute of Medicine 2003). Studies say their low-income jobs pay too much
to qualify for public assistance but pay too little to be able to afford private insurance
policies leaving individuals and families to live without coverage (Edin and Kefalas
2011). Lack of job-based insurance is also a reason why Hispanics have high uninsurance
rates. In addition, language barriers and immigration rules that prevent undocumented
and recent immigrants from enrolling in public plans prevent Hispanics from being
getting insurance (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2013; Goldman, Smith, and Sood 2005). Low
take-up of public insurance has been cited along with employment in jobs without health
benefits as the cause of high uninsurance rates among Asians (Institute of Medicine
2003). The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and other health policy measures are taking step
to address these issues. The ACA is offering government subsidies to help lower-income
working families without employer benefits afford private insurance plans. Medicaid
aims to expand eligibility beyond children and the medically needy to reduce uninsurance
rates among low-income, healthy adults. Outreach in multiple languages aims to lower
linguistic barriers to enrolling in both public and private insurance among Hispanics and
Asians.
The focus is clearly on insuring the uninsured. Cross-sectional evaluations of the
policy’s impact, while informative, overlook the beneficiaries’ potentially greater risk of
losing their new insurance coverage. Studies expect the ACA to increase enrollment
among racial and ethnic minorities (Clemans-Cope et al. 2012; Holahan and McGrath
2013 ) but this paper shows increasing enrollment does not necessarily translate into
proportionately higher insurance coverage rates.
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THEORY AND LITERATURE
Racial and ethnic disparities in insurance coverage rates result from differences in their
tendencies to lose or gain health insurance. In this section, I first briefly discuss the
necessity of examining health insurance status as a dynamic process. Second, I review the
literature on how the rates of gain or loss contribute to racial and ethnic disparities in
coverage rates. Third, I discuss the importance of comparing age-specific patterns of
insurance transitions to understand and to reduce coverage disparities.
Dynamic Nature of Insurance Coverage
I examine insurance coverage rates as a function of the population’s rates of
insurance gain and loss. This methodology of examining the uninsured stems from
research on the persistence of spells of poverty and unemployment (Bane and Ellewood
1985; Corcoran et al. 1985). Similarly to poverty and unemployment, a person’s
insurance status or a change in status is not permanent. Point-in-time estimates of the
uninsured are also over-represented by the proportion that has been uninsured for a long
time and masks the heterogeneity of the group (Swartz and McBride 1990; Swartz,
Marcotte, and McBride 1993; Monheit and Schur 1988). Examining insurance status as a
dynamic process can capture how frequently groups lose insurance and how long it takes
to gain insurance coverage again. This approach allows us to differentiate people who are
uninsured because they are more likely to lose insurance from people who are uninsured
because they are less likely to find insurance.
When researchers began to examine poverty as a dynamic process, scholarly
understanding of who experience poverty changed. The perception of the “underclass”
popularized by poverty debates in the 1960s (Harrington 1962; Willis 1977) gave way to
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new research in the 1970s and 1980s that showed the dynamic and heterogeneous nature
of falling into and out of poverty. People from various socioeconomic backgrounds
experienced poverty often coinciding with life events such as the birth of a child, starting
a new household, job loss, and divorce (Edwards 2014; Corcoran 1995).
Researchers have been applying these methods on longitudinal data to examine
the dynamics of health insurance coverage (Swartz and McBride 1990; Fairlie and
London 2009). The vast majority of people live without insurance in short spells; only a
small fraction of uninsured had been living without insurance for more than two years
(Swartz and McBride 1990; Congressional Budget Office 2003). The literature on
uninsurance is beginning to evolve from cross-sectional examinations of the uninsured to
studying the dynamics of insurance.
Young adults, individuals with less education, the unemployed, and the unmarried
have higher rates of losing health insurance. Trigger events such as losing employment,
changing jobs, losing a spouse are also connected to insurance loss (Lavelle and Smock
2012; Peters, Simon, and Taber 2014). Once an individual loses health insurance the
person’s demographic and socioeconomic characteristics also determine how quickly
they will regain coverage. Individuals with higher income, full-time employment, and
greater educational attainment have higher rates of gaining insurance which result in
shorter spells without insurance (Swartz, Marcotte, and McBride 1993).
Health insurance policies in the United States attempt to provide a safety net for
individuals who are experiencing life events that may trigger insurance loss. COBRA
allows individuals to temporarily maintain coverage from a private insurance plan after
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divorce or job loss. The Affordable Care Act aims to make health insurance more
accessible through exchanges and expanding Medicare eligibility.
Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Uninsurance
The African American and Hispanic population has a greater prevalence of trigger events
and socioeconomic characteristics that are associated with greater insurance loss and
slower insurance gain. Access to private health insurance coverage is tied to employment
and marriage in the United States. Minority groups are disadvantaged in both areas. Rates
of unemployment are higher among African American men and women than their nonHispanic white counterparts and job loss is more prevalent in among minority groups
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). African American and Hispanic individuals are less
likely to marry than non-Hispanic whites. Among those who did marry, their first
marriages are more likely to end in divorce and the proportion remarrying is lower than
non-Hispanic white men and women (Aughinbaugh , Robles, and Sun 2013; Bulanda and
Brown 2007).
Insurance policies that aim to provide safety nets during events associated with
insurance loss (COBRA) and needs-based public insurance options that makes insurance
more accessible (Medicaid) do not completely mitigate the insurance consequences of
socioeconomic differences.
Furthermore, Fairlie and London (2009) find that insurance coverage disparities
cannot be completely explained by compositional differences in educational attainment,
income, and employment. Prior studies show that racial or ethnic background did not
exert a significant impact on the rate of exiting an uninsurance spell (Swartz, Marcotte,
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and McBride 1993). Rather, African Americans and Hispanics’ had greater rates of
insurance loss than non-Hispanic whites (Fairlie and London 2008).
Age-Dependent Nature of Insurance Coverage
Health insurance coverage varies distinctly by age. Empirically, the insurance coverage
rate is below 10 percent for children under 18. The rate of uninsurance increases to
around 20 percent between 18 and 24 and reaches its peak in early adulthood between 25
and 35. The uninsurance rate decreases in later adulthood but does not reach under-18
levels until age 65 when the vast majority of US residents become eligible for Medicare
(Cohen and Martinez 2014).
Age-dependent demographic, economic, and policy factors lead to this agepattern of insurance coverage. Children under 18 can be eligible for needs-based
insurance coverage through state-sponsored programs such as Medicaid and Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Due to state-level eligibility rules, younger children
are more likely to have access to state-sponsored health insurance coverage than older
children. Children age out of public health insurance plans after turning 19 and can no
longer be enrolled in their parents’ private health plans after turning 26. Eligible pregnant
women and mothers of young children (generally affects people aged between 15 and 45)
can enroll in Medicaid. Getting married and having children is also associated with great
insurance gain among the general population (Fairlie and London 2008). Full-time
employees are more likely to gain and maintain health insurance coverage (Fairlie and
London 2008) and the proportion of the population with full-time employment steady
increases throughout adulthood till retirement at 65 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).
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From these age-dependent factors, I expect the rates of insurance gain to be highest
among children under 18 and the rates of insurance loss to peak in early adulthood.
DATA
I use the 2008 Panel of the Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP) to derive the
age-specific rates of losing and gaining health insurance that served as the basis of my
life-table calculations. The SIPP is a nationally representative series of longitudinal
panels whose survey duration ranges from 2.5 to 4 years. The first SIPP panel was
sampled in the early 1980s and a new panel was re-sampled from the noninstitutionalized population in the U.S. every one to four years. The SIPP revisits
respondent every four months and collects information on their insurance status for the
preceding four months. Each four-month period is known as a wave. SIPP’s 2008 panel
collected 14 waves for available respondents (non-institutionalized, US residents)
covering information across 56 months throughout 2008 to 2012.
Heaping is a known problem in the SIPP and respondents are biased towards
reporting changes to their insurance status at the beginning of each wave rather than at
the actual month that the change occurred. While monthly insurance status is available in
the SIPP, I have chosen to consider only the first reference month of each wave to
evaluate respondents’ insurance statuses and record changes. This method makes the
assumption that changes in insurance status can only happen up to once in a four-month
period. All calculations are weighted by SIPP’s person-level weights that account for
sampling and attrition.
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ANALYTIC STRATEGY
I utilize insurance data from the 2008 SIPP to calculate the rates of gaining and losing
insurance as well as rates of mortality. I derive these transition rates separately for each
race or ethnic group to compare their overall rates of insurance loss and gain. Rates of
insurance gain or loss depend on age. Thus, I calculate age-specific rates of insurance
transitions by race and create two-state increment-decrement life tables for each group to
describe the dynamics of living with and without insurance. I then compare the
differences in the proportion uninsured between race/ethnic groups by age. Lastly, I
decompose this difference across the life course to determine how much of the racial and
ethnic disparity can be explained by the differences in the rates of insurance gain or loss.
All analyses are limited to persons under 65 years of age. I describe this process in more
detail.
Calculating Transition Rates
To address the first research question, I calculate the rates of losing and gaining insurance
for each racial or ethnic group. The pattern of gaining and losing insurance resembles a
Poisson distribution (Swartz and McBride 1990). Using this property, I derive the
probability of losing or gaining insurance within a year of being insured or uninsured. I
took all persons whose insurance statuses were recorded in two consecutive waves and
calculated the proportion of insured in the former wave that was uninsured in the latter
wave. I repeat a similar calculation to derive the proportion of uninsured who gained
insurance in the later wave. From these proportions, I converted them into annual rates
using the assumption that these transitions occur in a Poisson process with a constant
rate.
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,
where i is the initial insurance status and j is the insurance status after 4 months for group
r. d denotes the number of people who transitioned from state i to j and p denotes the
number of persons in insurance state i at the beginning of the four-month period.
Using these rates I convert them into annual transition probabilities for each
group.
,
where i is the initial insurance status and j is the insurance status after 4 months group r.
These numbers represent the probability of losing or gaining insurance within one
year of being insured or uninsured. We can compare these rates between groups and
examine how fast one group loses or gains health insurance relative to another.
Creating Multi-state Increment-Decrement Models
These models describe how each racial and ethnic group transition between being insured
and uninsured throughout the life course taking into account differential rates of gaining
and losing insurance by age. They also include differential mortality by age and insurance
status.
First I derive the age-specific insurance transition and mortality probabilities by
group from the 2008 SIPP. I took all persons whose insurance or death status were
recorded in two consecutive waves and calculated the proportion who transitioned into
another state since the prior wave. I calculated these proportions separately by age at the
beginning of the prior wave. I derived the proportion that lost/gained insurance among
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those who had/did not have insurance at the beginning of the prior wave. In a similar
fashion, I calculate the proportion that gained insurance and the proportion that died from
each insurance state. Again using the properties of the Poisson distribution, I convert
these 4-month transitions probabilities into annual rates.

,
where i is the originating state (insured or uninsured) at age x and j is the transition state
(insured, uninsured, or dead) after 4 months, for group r. Using these rates, I calculate
transition probabilities for each age.
,
where i is the originating state (insured or uninsured) at age x and j is the transition state
(insured, uninsured, or dead) at age x+1, for group r.
These transition probabilities serves as the basis for the multi-state incrementdecrement life table that I created employing the methodology described in Schoen
(1975). This framework accounts for age-specific different transition forces between
states to estimate the number of person insured and uninsured across the life-course.
Comparing Standardized Life-Tables between Groups
By comparing the proportion uninsured at each age, we can determine the disparity in
insurance rates between racial and ethnic groups by age. Because these life tables are
solely derived from five factors—initial proportion without insurance at birth, agespecific rates of losing insurance, age-specific rates of gaining insurance, age-specific
rates of mortality for uninsured, and age-specific mortality for insured—we can compare
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the effects of the difference in one of the factors while standardizing the remaining four.
Taking the difference between equivalently standardized life-tables from two racial or
ethnic groups will display the age-specific disparity attributable to one of the five factors.
In this analysis, I specifically I examine the life-course disparity in uninsurance
prevalence due to difference in age-specific rates of gaining insurance and difference in
age-specific rates of losing insurance. I standardize all other factors using the
methodology described in Gupta (1993).
Decomposing the Disparity across the Life Course
The last component of this analysis calculates the proportion of the overall racial and
ethnic disparity that is caused by each of the five factors. I adapt the decomposition
methodology described in Gupta (1993) and apply the standardized life-tables created in
the previous section onto a common population distribution (US 2009 population). I then
derive the difference in the proportion uninsured attributable to each of the five factors.
These differences sum to the overall between-group difference. In addition, I examine the
disparity in terms of expected number of years lived without insurance between birth and
age 64. In a similar manner, I decompose the difference to determine how many more
years each factor contributes to a group living without insurance relative to non-Hispanic
whites.
RESULTS
I present the results in answer to this paper’s three research questions.
How much of between-race/ethnic disparity is explained by difference rates of insurance
gain? How much of it is explained insurance loss?
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Non-Hispanic whites have the smallest proportion (.12) living without health insurance
among African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians. In concordance with prior research,
the rate of uninsurance is very high among the Hispanic population (.35). A third of nonelderly Hispanic persons live without health insurance coverage. Table 3.1 presents these
results. The disparity in the expected number of years to live without insurance under
current conditions is also quite large. Whites are expected to live on average a little less
than eight years without insurance before reaching 65. In comparison, African Americans
are expected to live almost 13 years and Asian Americans, 10 years without health
insurance. Hispanics are expected to live over 22 years without health insurance coverage
before reaching 65.
The last two lines of Table 3.1 compare the dynamics of losing and gaining
insurance between the groups. The disparity in the rates of losing insurance is large. NonHispanic whites have a probability of .12 of losing health insurance within one year.
African Americans are twice as likely to lose insurance with a probability of .24.
Hispanics have a greater probability still at .31. The probability of losing insurance is not
as high for Asians at .15. In contrast, the disparity in the rates of gaining insurance
between groups is not as high. In fact, African Americans are more likely to get insured
within one year of losing insurance (.65) than non-Hispanic whites (.59). Hispanics are
about 13 percent less likely than whites to gain insurance after one year of living without
coverage.
A decomposition analysis of the race or ethnic difference in insurance coverage
confirms that differences in the rates of loss accounts for much of the disparity. Table 3.2
shows how much of the overall disparity is caused by each of the five factors. Negative
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numbers indicate that the minority group has an advantage over non-Hispanic whites for
the corresponding factor. All groups are compared to the non-Hispanic white population.
African Americans’ advantageous rates of insurance gain relative to non-Hispanic
whites are completely offset by their very high rates of loss. Their higher rates of
insurance gain alone would yield a lower prevalence of uninsurance relative to whites but
their significantly greater rates of loss, slightly higher rates of infants born without
insurance, and mortality patterns results in a difference of .08. That is, after accounting
for differences in population distribution, eight percent more African Americans live
without health insurance than whites. Seventy-eight percent of the Hispanic-white
disparity in insurance coverage is explained by their greater rates of coverage loss.
Twenty-two percent of the disparity is caused by their lower rates in obtaining health
insurance. The rates of insurance gain among Hispanics are the lowest relative to whites.
Together, they contribute to a greater proportion of Hispanics being uninsured (22%
more) than whites. Almost all of the Asian-white disparity—a difference of 4 percent—is
caused by Asians’ greater probability of losing insurance (98%).

How do the dynamics of losing and gaining insurance contribute to the disparity across
the life-course?
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion uninsured by race/ethnic group from birth to age 64.
Children under 18 have lower rates of uninsurance relative to adults within their
race/ethnic group. This reflects the availability of state-sponsored insurance options for
lower-income children. The age-specific patterns and levels of insurance coverage differ
substantially by group. The prevalence of uninsurance is the highest among Hispanics at
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all ages. The difference is particularly high after the age of 30. African American and
Asian children have similar coverage to non-Hispanic whites during childhood but they
diverge in young adulthood. The 20s is a period of high uninsurance for all groups but it
is particularly higher for minorities. African Americans’ coverage increases in later
adulthood but remains lower than whites until everyone qualifies for Medicare at age 65.
Asians’ coverage exceeds that of whites in their early 30s but steadily falls till 65. Much
of the coverage disparity between Asians and non-Hispanic whites originate from greater
uninsurance among middle-aged Asians.
Figure 3.2’s age-specific rates of insurance loss loosely mirrors the age-patterns
of insurance coverages rates. Insurance loss spikes in the early 20s for all groups but
Hispanics have the greatest loss rate at almost all ages. Insurance coverage is notably
precarious for African American infants and young adults; their rates of loss are similar
to that of Hispanics’ during these age groups. Asians have relatively higher rates of loss
during young adulthood and after age 40 reflecting their age-patterns of uninsurance
prevalence. Surprisingly, age-specific rates of insurance gain (Figure 3.2) are the highest
among African Americans. This gain-advantage over whites is particularly prominent
during childhood. Except for a brief period in early adulthood, African Americans have
advantageous insurance gain rates relative to whites throughout adulthood. The converse
is true for Hispanics. Their rates of insurance gain are lower than their white counterparts
at all ages. Asians’ rates of insurance gain are equivalent to that of whites after early
childhood.
How do these disparate age-specific rates of insurance gain and losses contribute
to the age patterns of uninsurance? Figures 3.3 to 3.5 examines the age-specific disparity
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in uninsurance rates of the three minority groups relative to the non-Hispanic population.
In each of these graphs, I show three lines. The solid line is the actual difference in the
proportion uninsured. Values above 0 indicate greater proportion of the minority group
without insurance. The dashed line is the simulated difference in proportion due to
differences in age-specific rates of insurance loss standardized for all other factors. This
can be interpreted as the disparity in uninsurance prevalence had only the rates of loss
been different. The dotted line is the simulated difference in proportion due to differences
in age-specific rates of insurance gain.
The prevalence of uninsurance among African American is higher than whites
throughout all ages. They are also more likely than whites to gain insurance at all ages
with the exception of a brief period in their early 20s. The dotted line in Figure 3.3 shows
that African Americans’ gain-advantage would yield lower rates of uninsurance than
whites. However, the high rates of insurance loss among African Americans more than
offset this gain-advantage. The dashed line in Figure 3.3 shows that African Americans
would have had an even higher uninsurance rate without their advantageous rates of
insurance gain.
The coverage disparity between Hispanics and whites are explained both by
Hispanics’ lower rates of insurance gain and higher rates of insurance loss (Figure 3.4).
Differences in rates of loss account for most of the coverage disparity in childhood but,
Hispanics’ increasing difficulty in gaining insurance becomes a greater contributor to
coverage disparity in adulthood.
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Asians’ rates of insurance loss account for almost all their lower coverage rates relative to
whites. Figure 3.5 shows that the simulated coverage disparity due to difference in
insurance loss closely follows the age-patterns of actual coverage disparity.

What is the expected number of years to live uninsured among minorities if they had the
same rates of insurance gain or loss of non-Hispanic whites?
Table 3.3 represents the findings in terms of number of years without insurance. These
numbers indicate the number of years a person would expect to live without coverage
before age 65 if he or she is exposed to the age-specific rates of insurance gain, insurance
loss, and mortality observed from cross-sectional data. African Americans are expected
to spend almost 5 more years without insurance throughout the life-course than nonHispanic whites. If they had the same rates of insurance loss as whites, African
Americans would spend 6.2 less years uninsured. From our previous graphs we saw that
the rates of insurance gain among African Americans were higher than non-Hispanic
whites. If the gain rates of African Americans’ were lowered to that of whites, the
African Americans would spend 1.3 more years without coverage. Ensuring that insured
Hispanics do not lose their coverage more than whites would reduce the expected number
of years without insurance by half from 22 years to 11 years. Increasing the rates of
insurance gain for uninsured Hispanics to white-levels would only decrease the expected
number of years spent without insurance to about 19 years. Asians are expected to live
about 2.5 years longer without insurance than whites. A small portion of that difference is
also due to lower under-65 mortality rates among Asians relative to whites (Table 3.3). If
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Asians were to have the same level of insurance security as whites, their expected years
without insurance would decrease to 8 years.
DISCUSSION
The results demonstrate that racial and ethnic disparities in overall health insurance
coverage are predominantly driven by differences in rates of insurance loss. Across the
life course, non-Hispanic whites are least likely to lose health insurance and thus, have
the greatest coverage. Early adulthood appears to be a time when minority groups are
doubly disadvantaged. They are more likely to lose insurance and take longer to find new
coverage than non-Hispanic whites. Differences in employment and marital status may
account for this effect. Young white adults are more likely to have an employer who
offers health insurance and to be married. During early adulthood, not only are the rates
of uninsurance the highest, but racial and ethnic inequalities are also the greatest.
The analyses in this paper do not distinguish the different forms of insurance:
employment-based private, marriage-based private, Medicaid, or Medicare.
Employment-based private insurance plans may be more stable than Medicaid.
Economic, demographic, and social inequalities between racial/ethnic groups determine
the types of health insurance that groups enroll in. The type of health insurance is a large
determinant in the likelihood of losing coverage. The analyses of this paper calculate the
inequalities in insurance gains and losses that result from these factors.
The SIPP does not include persons who are incarcerated. Almost ten percent of
African American adult men under 40 were incarcerated at any given day in 2010 (Neal
and Rick 2014). In comparison, less than three percent of non-Hispanic white men were
incarcerated. The disproportionately high incarceration rate among African American
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men may bias the results drawn from the SIPP. If these men were not incarcerated, the
insurance coverage disparity would increase as the uninsurance rate would likely be high
among those at risk for incarceration. More African American men without stable health
insurance coverage would be included in the analysis pool increasing the already large
coverage gap in early adulthood. The current results would be understating the racial
inequality.
It is very likely that high rates of insurance gain and loss will have negative
consequences on a person’s health care. After insurance loss, patients may need to stop
ongoing care. And when they re-gain insurance coverage, they may need to seek new
health care providers that accept the new plan. The frequent changes in sources of care
prevent patients from developing an ongoing, established relationship with health care
providers. Physicians have less knowledge of the medical history of new patients than
established patients. Levels of trust between physicians and patients may also be low.
These factors could contribute patients with unstable health insurance coverage to receive
poorer care compared to their continuously insured counterparts even when insured.
Unstable health insurance coverage may contribute to the empirically observed lower
levels of physician trust among patients of minority racial and ethnic backgrounds
(Blendon et al. 1995; Gamble 1993; Peterson 2002; Stepanikova et al. 2006).
Patients who have unstable insurance may make their medical decisions with the
expectation of losing insurance coverage. They may have a preference for shorter-term
solutions or treatments plans that requires less follow-up. Greater expectation of
insurance loss by either the patient or the physician may contribute to biases in referrals
to specialists and in receiving surgical procedures (Einbinder and Schulman 2000).
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While establishing a direct connection between insurance instability and health
care delivery is beyond the scope of this paper, the results draw attention to a potentially
large and significant mechanism through which health inequality persists between racial
and ethnic groups in the United States. Social and economic factors create unstable and
precarious insurance coverage among minority groups compared to non-Hispanic whites.
This greater insurance instability may translate into disparities in health care delivery and
inequalities in health outcomes.
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Table 3.1. Differences in prevalence and dynamics of uninsurance between groups
Non-Hispanic
White

African
American

Hispanic

Asian

Proportion without Insurance

0.12

0.20

0.35

0.16

Expected Years without Insurance

7.97

12.81

22.25

10.41

Probability of losing insurance within one year of being insured

0.12

0.24

0.31

0.15

Probability of gaining insurance within one year of being uninsured

0.59

0.65

0.51

0.58

Notes
Proportions without insurance and expected years without insurance derived from persons under 65.
Values represent uninsurance prevalence of a hypothetical cohort exposed to the age-specific rates of insurance gain, loss, and
mortality observed from cross sectional data.
Data Source: 2008 SIPP
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Table 3.2. Decomposition of disparity in proportion without health insurance prior to age 65
African American
v. non-Hispanic

Hispanic v. non-

white

(%)

Hispanic white

Asian v. non(%)

Hispanic white

(%)

Disparity due to insurance coverage at birth

0.00

0.20

0.00

0.16

0.00

-0.14

Disparity due to greater rate of insurance loss

0.10

125.81

0.17

77.67 0.04

97.91

Disparity due to lower rates of insurance gain

-0.02

-26.29

0.05

22.05 0.00

2.10

Disparity due to mortality among insured

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.04

0.00

-0.14

Disparity due to mortality among uninsured

0.00

0.17

0.00

0.07

0.00

0.26

Overall Difference

0.08

100

0.22

100

0.04

100

Values are standardized using the US population distribution in 2009 (Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.)
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Fig. 3.1. Age-specific patters of insurance coverage by race and ethnicity
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Fig. 3.2. Age-specific patterns of insurance gain, insurance loss, and mortality by race
and insurance coverage
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Fig. 3.3. Difference in proportion without health insurance between African Americans
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Notes
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of African Americans without insurance
relative to the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are
derived by taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for
differences due to gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions.
Population distribution standardized to the 2009 US population.
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation
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Fig. 3.4. Differences in proportion without health insurance between Hispanics and
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Notes
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of Hispanics without insurance relative
to the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are derived by
taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for differences due to
gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions. Population
distribution standardized to the 2009 US population.
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation
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Fig. 3.5. Differences in proportion without health insurance between Asians and whites
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Notes
Values greater than 0 indicate greater proportion of Asians without insurance relative to
the non-Hispanic White population. Difference from loss/ gains rates are derived by
taking the difference in simulated proportion uninsured controlling for differences due to
gain/loss, population distribution, mortality, and initial proportions. Population
distribution standardized to the 2009 US population.
Data Source: 2008 Survey of Income Program Participation
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Table 3.3. Actual and simulated expected number of years to live without insurance from birth to age 65
African
American

(%)

Hispanic

(%)

22.25
14.29

Asian

(%)

a

Actual expected years to live uninsured
Excess uninsured years relative to non-Hispanic whites (a - 7.97 years)

12.81
4.84

10.41
2.45

b

Years saved from reducing insurance loss to non-Hispanic white levels
Simulated expected years uninsured with white insurance loss rates (a - b)

6.19
6.62

48.3
51.7

11.04
11.21

49.6
50.4

2.36
8.05

22.7
77.3

c

Years saved from increasing insurance gain to non-Hispanic white levels
Simulated expected years uninsured with white insurance gain rates (a - c)

-1.29
14.10

-10.1
110.1

3.12
19.13

14.0
86.0

0.06
10.36

0.5
99.5

Notes
Values represent expected years without insurance for a hypothetical cohort exposed to the age-specific patterns of insurance
gain, loss, and mortality observed from cross-sectional data. Expected number of years without insurance for non-Hispanic
whites is 7.97 years. Negative values indicate that expected years uninsured will increase. Values are standardized using the
US population distribution in 2009 (Source: CDC/NCHS, National Vital Statistics System.)
Data Source: SIPP 2008
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